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  1950 
AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 
ALICE RISTROPH* 
Abstract: There is much criticism of America’s sprawling criminal system, but 
still insufficient understanding of how it has come to inflict its burdens on so 
many while seemingly accomplishing so little. This Article asks, as Americans 
built the carceral state, what were we thinking? The Article examines the ideas 
about criminal law that informed legal scholarship, legal pedagogy, and profes-
sional discourse during the expansion of criminal legal institutions in the second 
half of the twentieth century. In each of these contexts, criminal law was and still 
is thought to be fundamentally and categorically different from other forms of 
law in several respects. For example, criminal law is supposedly unique in its 
subject matter, uniquely determinate, and uniquely necessary to a society’s well-
being. This Article shows how this set of ideas, which I call criminal law excep-
tionalism, has helped make mass incarceration possible and may now impede ef-
forts to reduce the scope of criminal law. The aim here is not to denounce all 
claims that criminal law is distinct from other forms of law, but rather to scruti-
nize specific claims of exceptionalism in the hopes of better understanding crim-
inal law and its discontents. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Crisis” is an easy label to use, but a harder concept to define. Sometime 
in the early twenty-first century, commentators seemed to reach a consensus 
that American criminal law was in crisis.1 One typical and influential formula-
tion claims that criminal law in the United States has “unraveled,” or “run off 
the rails,” or “collapsed.”2 But the police still patrol, the courthouses remain 
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the 2018 Criminal Justice Roundtable at Harvard Law School, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 
the Buffalo Criminal Law Center at the University of Buffalo, and Osgoode Hall, York University. 
 1 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice for All, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 24 (2016) (“It 
is not hyperbolic to assert that our criminal justice system is very much in crisis. . . . [T]his crisis is 
widely acknowledged outside of the legal academy—so much so that, notwithstanding meaningful 
variation in how the problem is diagnosed, we see almost universal agreement throughout scholarly, 
popular, and political discourse: The criminal justice system needs fixing.”). 
 2 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 2, 5 (2011) [here-
inafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE]. Each of the quoted terms comes from the early pages of The Collapse of 
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open and keep producing convictions, and prisons and jails still take and keep 
custody of the bodies they are asked to contain. What, exactly, constitutes the 
crisis? 
The case for crisis often begins with recitations of high incarceration 
rates, but it does not stop there. Other “pathologies” of criminal law include 
the breadth of substantive criminal laws, wide enforcement discretion, the in-
fluence of partisan politics on both substantive criminalization and enforce-
ment practices, pronounced race and class disparities at nearly every stage of 
enforcement, excessive severity in both police practices and formal punish-
ments, and poor conditions in jails and prisons.3 It would be tempting to char-
acterize the crisis of criminal law as just the condition of too much criminal 
law—but complaints of inadequate criminalization, underenforcement, and 
intolerably high crime rates coexist with the complaints of overuse and severi-
ty. Indeed, the failure to address crime adequately is itself part of the crisis di-
agnosis.4 
The language of crisis has obvious rhetorical appeal. It has long been 
used to grab readers’ or listeners’ attention in contexts far beyond criminal 
law.5 Somewhat less obviously, but much more importantly, crisis discourse 
about criminal law has an ideological mission: it implicitly asserts that the ug-
liest aspects of criminal law are exceptional and temporary. The crisis para-
digm asserts the possibility of egalitarian, just, and effective criminal law. To 
characterize overcriminalization, or uneven enforcement, or racial disparities 
as pathological is an effort to distinguish these phenomena from our concep-
tions of normal, healthy criminal law. In other words, crisis implies a state of 
exception.6 The label of crisis, applied to the present, conjures a lost past when 
                                                                                                                           
American Criminal Justice. Id. at 1 (saw America’s criminal justice system “unravel”); id. at 2 (“the 
rule of law collapsed”); id. at 5 (“the criminal justice system has run off the rails”). 
 3 See infra Part I. 
 4 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 29 (1997) (explaining how inten-
tionally “underprotect[ing]” African Americans against criminality is historically one of America’s 
greatest failures); Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Crimi-
nal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3213–14 (2015) (noting that commentators worried 
about crimes against minorities and women have identified a “crisis” of underenforcement); Alexan-
dra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1715 (2006) (arguing that the problem 
of underenforcement needs more attention). 
 5 See Alice Ristroph, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, 25 CONST. COM-
MENT. 431, 431–32 (2009) (discussing “crisis” rhetoric employed by scholars in the context of consti-
tutional law). 
 6 For critiques of “crisis” discourse, see Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Sup-
posed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016); Kimberlé W. 
Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, 
Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1466 (2012). For a related critique of the inatten-
tion to historical continuities in American criminal law, see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND 
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 74 (2006). 
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criminal law was not in crisis. It suggests that we could yet make criminal law 
great again. 
If, in fact, American criminal law never was great, our analysis of the pre-
sent—and our plans for the future—may need reevaluation. This Article places 
the twenty-first century discourse of mass incarceration7 and criminal law cri-
sis in historical and intellectual context, identifying continuities that have gone 
underemphasized and clarifying the changes that did take place in the past half 
century. The changes are already familiar: incarceration rates, arrest rates, and 
other measures of the scale of criminal law increased rapidly in the last dec-
ades of the twentieth century. But other key phenomena associated with a con-
temporary crisis have in fact been attributes of American criminal law since 
the early days of the republic.8 Substantive criminal prohibitions have always 
sprawled broadly, reaching many forms of trivial misconduct. The actual fate 
of any defendant has always depended upon the vagaries of enforcement, the 
discretion of individual officials, and the social and class position of the par-
ticular defendant. Moreover, racialized enforcement is not a recent develop-
ment; enforcement practices have shown patterns of racial bias at least since 
the end of the Civil War. Finally, each generation of Americans has apparently 
viewed crime rates as too high and criminal law as an ineffective disgrace. 
To observe these continuities is not an invitation to complacency or an ef-
fort to undermine criminal law reform efforts. To the contrary, this Article ar-
gues that to figure out where we might want criminal law to go, we need a bet-
ter understanding of where we have been and where we are now. Asking how 
criminal justice came to be seen as a crisis invites a broader investigation of 
the ideological structures that shape the way we think about criminal law—and 
that limit the possibilities for change. If an ideology is a contingent and con-
testable description of the world that serves a particular power structure, then 
one can identify many ideologies that will, so long as they persist, make mean-
ingful change to American criminal law extremely unlikely.9 Chief among 
those ideologies is the idea that criminal law is uniquely just, important, and 
                                                                                                                           
 7 “Mass incarceration” is sometimes used to refer specifically to America’s high imprisonment 
rates, but the term has increasingly been used to describe the frequency of American criminal inter-
ventions even beyond the prison—police stops, arrests, misdemeanor convictions, the use of criminal 
records, noncustodial sanctions, and so on. For more on the meaning of “mass incarceration,” see 
infra Part III.B. 
 8 See infra Part I. 
 9 The term ideology is itself sometimes contested; “ideological” is occasionally wielded as an 
epithet. I strive to use “ideology” as political scientists and sociologists have often used it, to describe 
“public justifications for political activity” without necessarily embracing or denouncing those justifi-
cations. See KENNETH W. GRUNDY & MICHAEL A. WEINSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF VIOLENCE 4–6 
(1974). Grundy and Weinstein note that an ideology could be used to defend an existing normative 
order, to challenge it, or to attempt to build a new one. Id. 
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necessary. This Article focuses on various claims of criminal law exceptional-
ism—beginning with the claim of historical exceptionalism that underlies cri-
sis discourse, but then moving to more conceptual claims that criminal law is 
fundamentally different from other types of law.10 
It is helpful to identify the different strands of exceptionalism separately, 
and then to consider them in relation to one another. Historical exceptionalism 
begins with a descriptive claim about present practices—namely, that criminal 
law is now very different from what it used to be. Alongside the descriptive 
claim is usually a normative assessment that things have changed for the 
worse, and very much so. In the twentieth century, on this account, America 
went from a just and functional system of criminal law into an unjust and dys-
functional one.11 Claims of historical exceptionalism often focus on the well-
documented growth in American incarceration rates in the twentieth century, 
but it is not only incarceration rates that are portrayed as historically excep-
tional. After all, an increase, even a sharp one, in incarceration rates would not 
itself be seen as a crisis without some theory of how, and how much, we 
should use prison sentences. Accordingly, the historical exceptionalism of most 
interest here is the argument that links the increase in prisoners to a misuse or 
perversion of criminal law that began sometime in the twentieth century. 
The idea that criminal law is presently being misused requires, in turn, an 
account of how it should be used. There are many competing answers to that 
question, but we can identify three recurring claims, each asserting a kind of 
exceptionalism, each mixing normative aspirations with descriptive statements. 
One standard point of departure is the claim that the burdens of criminal law—
stigma and punishment—are distinctive.12 This claim, which I will call bur-
                                                                                                                           
 10 Scholars have identified claims of exceptionalism in various legal fields, usually to reject the 
claim that a given field should be governed by different principles or institutions than our default rule 
of law model would dictate. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Excep-
tionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2006) (arguing against tax exception-
alism); Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2016) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has been eliminating “patent exceptionalism”); David S. Rubenstein 
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 583 (2017). Of 
course, a claim that a given legal field is or is not exceptional is also a claim about what is normal, and 
the very proliferation of claims of exceptionalism may simply illustrate the lack of a single conception 
of legal normality. Given that the term exceptionalism is most often used by those critical of the sup-
posed exception, it is notable that “criminal law exceptionalism” is not a widely used term. The few 
usages of the phrase I have found are uncritical. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers 
and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1012 (2006) (“The case for what might be called crimi-
nal law exceptionalism starts with the text and structure of the Constitution itself.”). 
 11 See STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that “for much of American history . . . 
one might fairly say that criminal justice worked” but “[i]t doesn’t anymore”). 
 12 See, e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, 
Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 142–45 (2011) (arguing that crim-
inal convictions carry a unique stigma that distinguishes them from civil sanctions); Henry M. Hart, 
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dens exceptionalism, holds that criminal and civil laws should not be treated as 
interchangeable, and criminal sanctions require special justification. That justi-
fication is often supplied through two more claims of exceptionalism: subject-
matter exceptionalism, which claims that criminal law addresses, or should 
address, a discrete set of particularly harmful or wrongful behaviors, and oper-
ational exceptionalism, a term I use to capture a set of claims about the unique 
mechanics of criminal law. For example, operational exceptionalism encom-
passes the claim that criminal law both requires and provides a degree of de-
terminacy and predictability that is lacking in other areas of law.13 These three 
exceptionalist claims come together to produce an account of criminal law’s 
legitimacy: the unique burdens of criminal law are (or should be) imposed only 
in response to uniquely harmful or wrongful acts, and those burdens are (or 
should be) imposed only via determinate laws that give adequate notice of 
prohibited conduct and pursuant to careful procedures that ensure the actual 
guilt of the condemned. 
This Article scrutinizes these claims of criminal law exceptionalism. 
Some fare better than others. Burdens exceptionalism can be exaggerated, but 
there is nonetheless good reason to see criminal law’s impositions of physical 
force and social stigma as distinctive. Claims of subject-matter and operational 
exceptionalism, in contrast, are contradicted by empirical realities in varying 
degrees. Criminal sanctions are not reserved for a narrow subset of human be-
havior, but rather are used nearly everywhere that law regulates. And criminal 
law is at least as prone to indeterminacy as any other area of law; outcomes are 
at least as dependent on enforcement discretion here as anywhere else. Real 
life doesn’t match the exceptionalist paradigm, and that mismatch fuels the 
perception of crisis: the practices and institutions of criminal law are nowhere 
close to the expectations we have been taught to hold. 
To close that gap between expectation and practice, we could change our 
expectations, or we could change our practices. This Article argues that we 
should do both. Indeed, it suggests that we probably must do the former before 
we can do the latter. Paradoxically, the ideology of criminal law exceptional-
                                                                                                                           
Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405–06 (1958) [hereinafter 
Hart, Jr., Aims] (arguing that criminal sanctions carry a distinctive moral condemnation). 
 13 The idea that criminal law is, and must be, especially concerned with determinacy and fair 
warning finds expression in various doctrines, including the rule of lenity and void-for-vagueness due 
process principles. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of 
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189 (1985) (describing the ideal of legality, or clear ex ante defi-
nitions of crimes, as only “slightly unrealistic”). Operational exceptionalism presumes a sharp sub-
stance-procedure distinction, in which substantive guilt is something prior to and independent of the 
enforcement process. Critiques of the substance-procedure distinction are common to other fields of 
law, and the very fact that criminal law thinking has not seriously considered those critiques is itself a 
kind of exceptionalism. See infra Parts II and III. 
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ism has likely helped make mass incarceration possible. A nationwide, multi-
decade war on crime requires foot soldiers: it requires the participation of 
thousands of law enforcement officials. Mass incarceration requires mass pros-
ecutions, and thus this Article investigates the ideas about crime and criminal 
law that seem to have informed prosecutors—and other legal professionals—as 
they sought conviction after conviction. A penal system as large as America’s 
also requires money and other resources, which in turn require the support of 
the public and their representatives. The very belief that criminal law is excep-
tional—uniquely necessary, uniquely determinate, and uniquely circumscribed 
in its content—may have fueled the expansion of a system that is in fact none 
of those things. 
Moreover, our conceptual paradigms may hinder present efforts to under-
stand or reverse mass incarceration by shaping where scholars choose to look 
and what seems important. Across a large literature that investigates how 
America’s prison population, and other criminal law interventions, grew so 
dramatically in the twentieth century, there has been too little attention to his-
tory, and almost no attention to intellectual history. Indeed, scholars sometimes 
depict American criminal law as intellectually empty—a chaotic jumble of 
populist emotion and unprincipled politics. Many studies examine public opin-
ion on issues of crime and punishment, but measures of general public puni-
tiveness cannot provide a full account of how or why experts, political offi-
cials, and legal professionals built a carceral state.14 Scholars have not scruti-
nized closely the models and expectations of criminal law held by the most 
influential actors in the criminal legal system, perhaps because scholars hold 
the same models and expectations. This Article undertakes that inquiry into the 
ideologies behind mass incarceration. 
Accordingly, the Article begins with an attempt to expand our fields of vi-
sion by placing the current crisis of criminal law in a somewhat broader histor-
ical context. To that end, Part I investigates claims of historical exceptionalism. 
It demonstrates that, with the important exception of incarceration rates, a top-
ic deferred until Part III, many of the features of American criminal law that 
trouble us today have been present throughout the life of the country. Part II 
then asks how overcriminalization and irregular enforcement, if so familiar 
across American history, could come to be seen as features of a crisis. This Part 
examines the mid-twentieth-century development and promulgation of a par-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, e.g., PETER ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE UNITED STATES BECAME THE 
MOST PUNITIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 73–98 (2016) (offering an analysis of the political and 
social processes that have led to the United States becoming the most punitive nation in the world); 
LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND POPULISM 30–45 (1998) (conducting a 1998 
study of federal crime legislation in the United States that predates the embrace of the phrase “mass 
incarceration,” but highlights similar themes of populist punitiveness). 
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ticular normative vision of criminal law based on further claims of exception-
alism. Part III then moves to the last decades of the twentieth century, when 
scholars, jurists, advocates, and practitioners educated in this normative vision 
initially embraced policies that dramatically expanded the reach of criminal 
law. How that initial embrace turned into a sense of crisis in the early twenty-
first century is a still-evolving story. But one point of continuity, thus far, is 
worth noting: criminal law exceptionalism still governs public and professional 
discourse. If indeed this intellectual framework helped us build the carceral 
state, we should question whether it will allow any significant reform. The 
Conclusion examines some risks and potential payoffs of resisting criminal law 
exceptionalism. 
I. THE NIGHTMARE 
Criticisms of American criminal justice are abundant and varied, and it is 
certainly possible to overstate the degree of consensus about what, exactly, is 
wrong.15 All the same, a few recurring points are raised so often that one can 
fairly characterize them as the main ingredients of the perceived crisis. First, 
and perhaps easiest to verify, is the U.S. incarceration rate, which increased 
rapidly during the last three decades of the twentieth century, and which re-
mains about five times higher than it was in 1970.16 The U.S. incarceration rate 
is exceptional not only in terms of this country’s own history, but also in com-
parison to other developed nations.17 Still, if one believes that criminal laws 
should produce some prisoners, then an increase in prisoners is not itself obvi-
ously a crisis or even a problem—do we punish too many people now, or did 
we punish too few in the past? To buttress the claim that current levels are too 
high, other attributes of criminal law are identified alongside incarceration 
rates as evidence of crisis: overcriminalization, or the prohibition of conduct 
that should not be treated as criminal at all;18 severe punishments; wide en-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 
259 (2018) (identifying distinct critiques of the United States’ criminal justice system notwithstanding 
the appearance of a “purported consensus” on criminal justice reform). 
 16 See, e.g., Derek Neal & Armin Rick, The Prison Boom and Sentencing Policy, 45 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1–3 fig.1 (2016). 
 17 See PETER WAGNER & WENDY SAWYER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, STATES OF INCARCERA-
TION: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 2018 fig.1, https://prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.
cc/SX2P-UGNM] (comparing the U.S. incarceration rate of 698 per 100,000 to other founding NATO 
countries, none of which have an incarceration rate greater than 139 per 100,000). 
 18 See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 1 
(2008); Ellen S. Podgor, Symposium, Foreword, Overcriminalization 2.0: Developing Consensus 
Solutions, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 565, 565 (2011); Symposium, Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 525 (2012). 
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forcement discretion, especially that of prosecutors and police officers;19 and 
race and class disparities throughout the system.20 Together, these phenomena 
produce a world in which criminal law appears not as a salutary component of 
a stable society, but rather as an instrument for the privileged and the dominant 
to suppress the weak, especially poor people of color.21 That suppression often 
takes the form of imprisonment, but it takes other forms as well, including 
noncustodial sanctions, police harassment and brutality, and social and civil 
disabilities associated with criminal records.22 
To label these phenomena as a crisis is to suggest that they are anomalous 
or unprecedented. It is to suggest a background condition of criminal law not 
plagued by these current afflictions. At least some commentators have made 
these suggestions explicitly. For example, one common narrative holds that a 
political backlash to constitutional criminal procedure decisions by the Warren 
Court led American legislatures to expand substantive criminal prohibitions 
dramatically.23 This expansion of substantive criminal law then gave police 
and prosecutors discretion that they had not previously known, and that discre-
tion was exercised in racially biased ways that increased inequities in the sys-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
5–7 (2007) (discussing the wide discretion afforded to prosecutors and police in the American crimi-
nal justice system); David Thacher, Channeling Police Discretion: The Hidden Potential of Focused 
Deterrence, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 533, 533, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2016/iss1/
13 [https://perma.cc/6VG3-DKHZ] (“The breadth of the criminal law and the unfettered discretion it 
creates are among the most significant challenges facing American criminal justice today.”). 
 20 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–9 (1999) (discussing the disparities that are “built into the very structure and doc-
trine of our criminal justice system”); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 12 (1999) (discussing 
the impact of incarceration on African American communities); Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: 
Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1207–13 (2018) (discussing racial dis-
parities in criminal sentencing and plea bargaining); Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the 
Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649 (2017) (discussing how the criminal defense bar is 
“complicit” in the “racial disparities” and injustice in the American criminal justice system). 
 21 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS 7 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 22 See id. at 13 (defining the term “mass incarceration” to refer “not only to the criminal justice 
system but also to the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those labeled crimi-
nals both in and out of prison”). 
 23 This claim was central to much of William Stuntz’s work, though Stuntz softened his causal 
assertion in the book he completed just before his death. Compare William J. Stuntz, The Political 
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 781 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, The Politi-
cal Constitution of Criminal Justice] (“The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after helped 
to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after.”), with STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 242 
(“The Court’s decisions probably exacerbated both crime and punishment trends, but the trends them-
selves had other causes. . . . But if the Justices did not cause the backlash, they made a large contribu-
tion to it.”). 
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tem.24 Another critique argues that professionalization and bureaucracy caused 
American criminal justice to lose its essential connections to the morality of 
local communities; this critique is similarly premised on a vision of a just and 
happier past.25 
Aside from incarceration rates, however, other features of American crim-
inal law associated with a contemporary crisis have been present from the ear-
liest days of the republic. First, the range of conduct defined as criminal has 
always been extremely broad, reaching far beyond the prototypical acts of vio-
lence and property offenses now associated with the core of criminal law.26 
Criminal law has long been widely used to punish idleness, immorality, and 
nonconformity; it was and still is also used to enforce “regulatory” matters 
such as commercial operations. Second, whether a given act will lead the actor 
to be classified as criminal is a question that has long been determined over the 
course of an erratic and often arbitrary enforcement process. Substantive crime 
definitions, whether statutory or judicial, have never disciplined enforcement 
very closely. Moreover, the racial and socioeconomic biases that have long 
shaped official decisions in other areas of law have mattered just as much, if 
not more, in criminal law. 
I develop these historical claims in more detail below, but two initial ca-
veats are in order. First, though this Part highlights continuities across time, it 
does not deny that much has changed in American criminal law since the 
founding of the country. The point is simply that some of the specific features 
of criminal law that seem so terrible today have a much longer history than we 
have so far acknowledged. Second, I have not attempted to reconstruct these 
details of American legal history by wading into primary sources myself, but 
rather have relied on the work of widely cited legal historians.27 This Part con-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 2. The nostalgia for a lost era is explicit in Stuntz’s 
introduction: “For much of American history [outside the South,] criminal justice institutions pun-
ished sparingly, mostly avoided the worst forms of discrimination, controlled crime effectively, and 
for the most part, treated those whom the system targets fairly.” Id. 
 25 “Criminal justice used to be individualized, moral, transparent, and participatory but has be-
come impersonal, amoral, hidden, and insulated from the people. . . . Appreciating what we have lost 
can inspire reforms to revive these classic values in the modern justice system.” STEPHANOS BIBAS, 
THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xviii (2012). Bibas does acknowledge the existence of 
racial and other biases in early American criminal law, but celebrates the period regardless. “True, 
punishments could be brutal, procedural safeguards were absent, and race, sex, and class biases all 
clouded the picture. Nonetheless, the colonists had one important asset that we have lost: members of 
the local community actively participated and literally saw justice done.” Id. at xix. 
 26 Notwithstanding the frequent framing of “overcriminalization” as a twentieth-century phenom-
enon, at least some scholars have observed that sprawling substantive prohibitions have characterized 
American criminal law from its earliest years. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, History’s Challenge to 
Criminal Law Theory, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 271, 273–74 (2009). 
 27 The classic grand histories of American law and legal thought have mostly neglected criminal 
law, suggesting that criminal law exceptionalism is influential even outside the field of criminal law 
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solidates themes that run across many different historical studies but remain 
overlooked by criminal law scholars: the breadth of American criminal law 
even in earlier eras, the importance of enforcement decisions from the nation’s 
earliest days, and the longstanding influence of race and class. 
A. Conduct Defined as Criminal 
To evaluate the depiction of overcriminalization as a recent phenomenon, 
this Section examines “substantive” American criminal law in earlier periods.28 
That task faces this challenge: early in the country’s history and throughout its 
first century or so, crimes were defined by both common law and numerous 
statutes and codes.29 Common law crimes included not only traditional and 
judicially defined offenses such as murder and burglary, but also conduct de-
termined after the fact to be sufficiently injurious to the public.30 The nine-
teenth century saw movements toward codification in many areas of law, and 
by the mid-twentieth century, most U.S. jurisdictions had expressed a prefer-
                                                                                                                           
itself. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, at vii–viii (1977) (noting the au-
thor’s expertise in commercial law and relative inattention to criminal law); MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at xii (1977) (noting the book’s focus on 
private law); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 4–5 
(1992) (detailing focus on private law). But see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 204–07 (discussing various challenges to the public-private distinc-
tion, including Progressive thinkers’ argument that property law is in fact public law). Meanwhile, 
influential book-length histories of American criminal law have tended to focus on a particular juris-
diction in a specific time frame, rather than surveying all of U.S. history like Gilmore or Horwitz. See 
generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870–1910 (1981); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 (1989); MARY E. VOGEL, 
COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS, AND THE MAKING OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY, at vii–viii (2007). One notable exception, a panoramic survey of American criminal 
legal practices from the colonial period through the twentieth century, is LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3–6 (1993) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT]. For another broad overview, albeit one far less detailed, see ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1939 (2011). 
 28 It is somewhat anachronistic to speak of “substantive criminal law” in the seventeenth or eight-
eenth centuries, as the conceptual distinction between substantive law and procedure developed only 
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. Neverthe-
less, one of criminal law’s functions—the classification of conduct as criminal—preexists the sub-
stance-procedure dichotomy and is worth examining across different eras of American law. 
 29 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 20–21 (noting the settlers’ 
initial adoption of the English common law of crimes); id. at 32–34 (discussing colonial criminal 
codes); id. at 63–65 (discussing codification movements and growing disapproval of common law 
crimes throughout the nineteenth century). A separate challenge arises from the fact that the modern 
concept of “substantive law,” distinct from procedure, arose only in the nineteenth century. In the 
colonies and in the first years of the new republic, there is little evidence of any delineation of “sub-
stantive criminal law” as an independent field. See infra Part I.B. 
 30 See Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955). 
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ence or an outright requirement that crimes be defined by statute. From our 
perch in today’s statutory world, one must remember that any attempt to meas-
ure growth in substantive criminal law over time must take into account the 
flexibility of earlier common law standards. In other words, we cannot simply 
count statutes.31 
With a closer look at what has been defined as criminal, whether by judg-
es or legislators, it is clear that American criminal law has always reached 
much farther than the purportedly paradigmatic crimes of homicide, rape, and 
robbery.32 Those specific offenses shape many discussions of crime, and of 
crime rates, but they comprise only a tiny fraction of the conduct formally 
identified as criminal or actually prosecuted.33 What sort of conduct has been 
the usual concern of criminal prosecutions? Drunkenness, vagrancy, and other 
so-called “public order” offenses, along with property crimes, have long gen-
erated a substantial majority of criminal prosecutions, under both common law 
and statutory regimes, and especially as public officials took over primary re-
sponsibility for initiating criminal cases.34 “For much of our history, drunken-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
513–15 (detailing the increase in the number of statutes in state and federal penal codes). Interesting-
ly, some of the specific statutes cited by Stuntz to illustrate the purportedly recent phenomenon of 
overcriminalization were in place long before the Warren Court issued the criminal procedure deci-
sions that, according to Stuntz, triggered a legislative backlash and expansion of substantive criminal 
law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 877.16 (2000) (prohibiting the exhibition of deformed animals, and enact-
ed at least as early as 1921). 
 32 It would be useful to have a separate label for murder, rape, and robbery—murdroppery?—
given that these offenses are the very epitome of criminality in the public imagination, and even in 
expert analysis. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports classify murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault together as “violent crime,” and legal scholars frequently use this 
statistic to determine “crime rates” more generally. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still 
Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects 
on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685, 716 (2017) (determining “crime rates” using UCR “violent 
crime” data). On the breadth of early American criminal law, see David J. Rothman, Perfecting the 
Prison, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 100, 101 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 
1995) (noting that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Americans viewed “an exceptionally wide 
range of conduct” as criminal). 
 33 See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 573 (2011); 
Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 565 (2018) [hereinafter 
Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry] (arguing that enforcement choices play such a significant role in 
defining conduct as criminal that it is misleading to identify statutes or judicial opinions as the “sub-
stance” of criminal law); see also infra Part I.B. 
 34 Allen Steinberg’s study of Philadelphia’s criminal courts in the nineteenth century illustrates 
this shift. “Nonindictable offenses—primarily drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy—were 
most often state-initiated. Indictable offenses—mostly assault and battery and petty larceny—were 
usually private prosecutions. Before the professionalization of the police, nonindictable offenses were 
probably only a minority of the cases heard by aldermen. Afterwards, they were undoubtedly the ma-
jority.” STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 29. A major theme of Steinberg’s study is the strategic use of 
criminal prosecutions to deal with an array of social problems, including resolution of private dis-
putes. In that vein, Steinberg identifies disorderly conduct as a possible exception to the general rule 
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ness was the single most frequently punished crime—the plankton of the crim-
inal sea.”35 The criminalization of alcohol-related offenses reached its apex in 
1920 with Prohibition, when the United States went so far as to amend the 
Constitution to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and distribution of liquor, and to 
empower the federal government to enforce the ban.36 This experiment lasted 
only fourteen years; in 1933, the Constitution was amended again and the ap-
propriate regulation of liquor was left to the jurisdiction of individual states.37 
States did and do maintain extensive criminal statutes related to liquor, but 
over the twentieth century the basic crime of public intoxication became less 
frequently enforced.38 Meanwhile, as the automobile became increasingly im-
portant to Americans’ daily lives, traffic offenses “replaced drunkenness and 
loitering as the basic fodder of justice.”39 
Vagrancy and similar offenses claimed a large share of actual prosecu-
tions until the 1970s, when the Supreme Court limited states’ ability to crimi-
nalize vagrancy.40 A flurry of recent scholarship has emphasized the degree to 
which misdemeanor cases overwhelm felony prosecutions, but it is the scholar-
                                                                                                                           
that state prosecutors were more likely than private citizens to pursue minor charges. “Disorderly 
conduct was a vague and complicated category,” which may have made it especially fruitful “as a 
source of manipulation for aldermen, policemen, and private citizens alike.” Id. at 31; see also SAMU-
EL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 71 (2d ed. 1998) (not-
ing that over the course of the nineteenth century, private prosecutions were increasingly limited to 
murder or other major crimes). 
 35 FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 2. In nineteenth-century Philadelphia, 
drunkenness prompted the overwhelming majority of police arrests both before and after police pro-
fessionalization in the city. See id. at 121–22; STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 30; see also William C. 
Carriger, Comment, The Law of Public Drunkenness, 34 TENN. L. REV. 490, 490–97 (1967) (discuss-
ing the variety and breadth of public intoxication crimes). 
 36 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (enacted to provide for en-
forcement of the Eighteenth Amendment). 
 37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 38 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Offenses, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1395, 1411–
15 (2002) (defining “penumbral offenses” as acts formally prohibited yet widely practiced and tolerat-
ed by public officials, and discussing public intoxication and other alcohol-associated crimes such as 
underage drinking, as examples of such offenses). 
 39 FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 278. See generally SARAH SEO, POLIC-
ING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM (2019). 
 40 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (declaring a Jacksonville 
vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague). See generally RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: 
POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (providing an 
overview of vagrancy law and constitutional challenges to it in the twentieth century). Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville constrained states’ ability to convict for vagrancy, but this limitation has proven 
relatively inconsequential, in part because other enforcement tactics have allowed police to accom-
plish through other means many of the functions of vagrancy arrests. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 2–3 (1968) (authorizing police to stop, frisk, and question individuals on the basis of “reason-
able suspicion” of criminal activity). 
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ly attention to misdemeanors that is new, not their prevalence.41 Among the 
ostensibly more severe offenses punished as felonies, property crimes generat-
ed the plurality of cases until the late twentieth century, when drug offenses 
began to compete for status as the most common felony. Narcotics trafficking, 
manufacturing, and possession certainly grew in importance as alcohol offens-
es faded; first states and then the federal government adopted increasingly de-
tailed and far-reaching prohibitions.42 Importantly, narcotics offenses are now 
very often charged as felonies, punishable with prison time or other severe col-
lateral consequences, whereas many alcohol-associated offenses were and are 
misdemeanors.43 One should not minimize the impact of this shift and other 
consequences of the War on Drugs, which helped fuel the expansion of en-
forcement discussed in Part III. But nor should we forget that the use, posses-
sion, or distribution of intoxicating substances was seen as worthy of criminal 
intervention long before the War on Drugs began. 
I have mentioned crimes of intoxication, traffic and public order offenses, 
property crimes, and offenses involving interpersonal violence. That list covers 
much of what has been criminalized in the United States over time, but it is 
hardly comprehensive. In almost any field of conduct subject to state or federal 
regulation, criminal sanctions can be found. “Crime” is a category defined by 
the state’s labels and the state’s responses; it is not a category that is limited to 
a particular kind of conduct.44 But it is worth noting two more broad categories 
of offenses that have existed in American criminal law since its earliest years: 
“morals” offenses and “regulatory” offenses. By morals offenses, I mean pro-
hibitions of acts that do not fall within traditional categories of “crimes against 
persons” or “crimes against property,” yet are nonetheless condemned as im-
                                                                                                                           
 41 See JOHN H. LINDQUIST, MISDEMEANOR CRIME: TRIVIAL CRIMINAL PURSUIT 17 (1988) 
(“Clearly misdemeanor offenses are the most dominant theme of the statutes of the states. They are 
the basic means of controlling behavior and of identifying the moral standards expected of the citi-
zens. This same situation held true in colonial America.”). As Lindquist notes, the very definitions of 
misdemeanor (and felony) have not been static, and a great deal of conduct is chargeable as either a 
felony or a misdemeanor. See id. at 11–13. All the same, it is clear that the great majority of criminal 
prosecutions involve misdemeanor charges, and that appears to have been true throughout American 
history. See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 117–18 (observing percentages 
of misdemeanor arrests in Alameda County from 1872–1910); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012) (noting that, although misdemeanor cases are “radically underdoc-
umented” in comparison to felony cases, a variety of sources compiled over several decades indicate 
that misdemeanors constitute between seventy-five to ninety percent of state criminal dockets). 
 42 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 354–56. 
 43 See generally Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, supra note 33, at 590–99 (discussing the pros-
ecutorial shift from charging misdemeanors to charging felonies and the discretion involved in those 
decisions). 
 44 See Glanville Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 107, 107 (1955). 
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moral.45 Sexual activity figures prominently in this category: for much of U.S. 
history, sexual activity outside of marriage (including same-sex intimacy) was 
classified as criminal.46 Criminal law was also used to censor obscene books, 
art, and even profane speech. Gambling and prostitution have been, and still 
are, often prohibited as an affront to morality. The colonies and the newly 
formed states punished an array of other offenses against morality, many relat-
ed to religious offense: failure to attend church; disturbing church services or 
reviling church ministers; engaging in commerce, sport, or other prohibited 
activities on the Sabbath.47 
Moreover, American criminal law has punished regulatory offenses from 
its earliest decades. As with morals offenses, the concept of a regulatory of-
fense is not precisely defined, but it is now commonly used to describe crimi-
nal laws that address “matters within the purview of federal, state, and local 
administrative agencies, such as the environment, product and workplace safe-
ty, labor and employment, transportation, trade, the issuance of securities, the 
collection of taxes, housing, and traffic and parking.”48 Regulatory offenses are 
frequently presented as a twentieth-century development, especially by their 
critics, many of whom endorse subject-matter exceptionalism and suggest a 
lost age of narrowly tailored criminal law.49 But such offenses have been 
common since the colonial period.50 Even before the proliferation of federal 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Crimes against persons—typically, acts of interpersonal physical violence—and crimes against 
property are, of course, frequently characterized as immoral. But the phrase “morals offenses” is most 
often used to describe a different category of crime: acts that frequently do not harm a specific victim 
but rather offend widely shared moral sensibilities. See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra 
note 27, at 126 (noting the difficulty of defining “moral crimes” as a category, but offering a descrip-
tion akin to mine here). 
 46 See id. at 127–32 (describing criminal regulation of sexual behavior in the nineteenth century); 
id. at 325–34 (same, but in the twentieth century). 
 47 See BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606–1660, at 137 (1983); 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 34–35; id. at 127 (giving examples of nine-
teenth-century “Sunday laws”); VOGEL, supra note 27, at 33 (listing a random sample of cases from 
the Boston Police Court from 1830 to 1860, including such offenses as “retailing spirits on Sunday” 
and “secular business on Lord’s Day”). Vogel’s list also includes one prosecution for “humming 
tunes,” but there is no indication of the day of the week on which the offensive humming occurred. 
VOGEL, supra note 27, at 33. 
 48 Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1544 (1997). But see ALAN NORRIE, 
CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 104 (3d ed. 2014) 
(noting that although “technical” or “regulatory” offenses “can often be identified sociologically, 
attempts to comprehend the distinction from a legal point of view are fraught with difficulty”). 
 49 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1074–76 (2014) (claiming, without citation, 
that before the twentieth century, regulatory or “public welfare” offenses were limited to the sale of 
impure food or alcohol). 
 50 VOGEL, supra note 27, at 33. A random sample of cases from the Boston Police Court between 
1830 and 1860 includes an array of crimes that would today be classified as regulatory: “remaining 
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administrative agencies, state and local authorities used criminal sanctions to 
address problems from the quality of goods and food to the safety of public 
spaces to the protection of free markets.51 Regulatory offenses illustrate well 
the dynamism of criminal law: criminal sanctions have often been introduced 
to deal with new coordination problems and other challenges that arise with 
increased urbanization or other broad societal changes. Today, the U.S. gov-
ernment regulates almost every area of life, and wherever it regulates, it cre-
ates some options to charge criminal offenses. The reach of the regulatory state 
has expanded, to be sure, but the choice to use criminal law as a regulatory 
device is not new. 
Criminal law has itself been dynamic, but it has frequently been deployed 
to preserve existing social hierarchies and to resist broad social change. Crimi-
nal law was used to protect the institution of slavery, of course, and it has been 
used to enforce ideas about proper social ordering many times since the Civil 
War and Reconstruction.52 Consider several canonical cases of constitutional 
equality and the laws at stake in each one. When Homer Plessy was removed 
from the East Louisiana Railway train for sitting in a car reserved for white 
passengers, he was subject to criminal prosecution and punishment.53 When 
Robert Meyer spoke German, rather than English, to teach Nebraska school-
children, he was convicted of a misdemeanor criminal offense.54 When Estelle 
Griswold distributed contraception in Connecticut, she violated a criminal law 
and was criminally prosecuted.55 When Yick Wo, a Chinese immigrant, operat-
ed a laundry in a wooden building without special permission from the city of 
San Francisco (permission that was consistently granted only to non-Chinese 
applicants), he committed a misdemeanor offense and was jailed and fined.56 
These cases from the equality canon are unusual in that the criminal sanctions 
were eventually declared impermissible by the Supreme Court, but the de-
                                                                                                                           
open past 10 p.m.,” “removing house offal against by-laws,” “keeping swine in street,” “driving horse 
to left of center,” “horse at large,” “sidewalk iced more than 6 hrs.,” and so on. Id. 
 51 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 113–18 (discussing regulatory 
crimes from the colonial period to the nineteenth century); id. at 282–85 (explaining the expansion of 
the regulatory state in the twentieth century, and the concomitant proliferation of regulatory crimes); 
see also Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 657, 658 (2011); Ronald F. Wright & Paul Huck, Counting Cases About Milk, Our 
“Most Nearly Perfect” Food, 1860–1940, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 56 (2002) (noting that authori-
ties relied on criminal sanctions even more than civil law to ensure safe milk, and using milk-related 
crimes to develop the history of regulatory crimes more generally). 
 52 See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860 (1996). In 
Virginia, even to criticize the institution of slavery was a criminal offense at one time. See FRIEDMAN, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 89. 
 53 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896). 
 54 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923). 
 55 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
 56 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357–60 (1886). 
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ployment of criminal sanctions to accomplish whatever general goals the state 
wants to pursue—including the enforcement of racial hierarchies or other ine-
qualities—is not unusual at all.57 
Against the historical exceptionalism that posits broad criminal prohibi-
tions as a late-twentieth-century development, a more careful study reveals that 
criminal prohibitions have always reached a vast range of conduct, including 
very ordinary acts.58 Moreover, physically violent offenses have been a small 
minority of all crimes prosecuted.59 Of course, there are some changes amidst 
the continuities. For example, the subcategory of offenses categorized as felo-
nies has likely grown in the twentieth century, so that many offenses previous-
ly classified as misdemeanors are now chargeable as felonies.60 With more op-
portunities to charge felonies, the discretion of enforcers increases—but the 
increase has only magnified already substantial discretion, as the next Section 
shall show. 
B. Enforcement Choices 
So far, I have detailed the wide range of conduct defined as criminal 
without focusing much on who does the defining. Criminal law as a common-
law field gave judges considerable power to define crime; the move toward 
                                                                                                                           
 57 In Lawrence Friedman’s grand survey of the history of American criminal law, three consecu-
tive chapters identify three enduring and overlapping themes that shaped choices to define conduct as 
criminal through the end of the nineteenth century. Criminal laws were designed to protect existing 
allocations of power, both racial and economic; more narrowly, they were designed to vindicate par-
ticular property rights; and more generally, they were designed to prohibit acts that offended prevail-
ing but contingent conceptions of morality, such as sexual impropriety or drunkenness. See FRIED-
MAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 83–106 (“Power and Its Victims”); id. at 107–24 
(“Setting the Price: Criminal Justice and the Economy”); id. at 125–48 (“Morals, Morality, and Crim-
inal Justice”). 
 58 Cf. Rothman, supra note 32, at 101 (noting that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Americans 
viewed as criminal “an exceptionally wide range of conduct”); see also JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW 
AND SOCIETY 68–70 (1935). 
 59 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 2. Friedman characterizes America 
in the second half of the twentieth century as a world of rising serious crime, but even in his snapshot 
year of 1990, he reports 2.3 million victims of “violent crime” among 34.8 million total incidents of 
crime. Id. at 451. To be sure, physically violent offenses occur much more frequently in the United 
States than other countries, and one should not minimize the harm of these crimes. See generally 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA (1997) (arguing that it is rates of lethal violence, rather than rates of all criminal offending, 
that distinguish the United States from other developed nations). But the point remains: by the num-
bers, criminality in America is not primarily a matter of physical violence. 
 60 See Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, supra note 33, at 598–601; see also David T. Hardy, 
District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Present as Interface of Past 
and Future, 3 NE. U. L.J. 199, 210–11, 210 n.71 (2011) (noting that “fighting a duel, drawing a deadly 
weapon, running an opium den, and selling cocaine” were misdemeanors under the 1939 Arizona 
criminal code). 
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codification shifted significant power to legislatures. It is a mistake, however, 
to conceive of criminal law strictly in terms of legislatures and courts. Crimi-
nal law means relatively little until it is enforced, and enforcement agents have 
a great deal of power to decide what, or who, is criminal. That is a common 
complaint about American criminal law today, but it is not a new state of af-
fairs.61 Indeed, complaints about insufficient, selective, or arbitrary enforce-
ment extend back to the earliest days of American criminal law.62 
1. From Private to Public Enforcement 
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States did not 
have much of a public enforcement apparatus. Early American communities 
lacked professional police forces and relied on lay volunteers, or conscripts 
called to service, as constables and watchmen.63 Public prosecutors were intro-
duced relatively early, but they lacked the funding and staffing to enforce all of 
the sprawling criminal codes.64 Initially, the public prosecutor of a given juris-
diction was likely to be a part-time official working without administrative 
assistance. Early prosecutors were often “moonlighters,” better paid for the 
legal services they provided to private clients, and thus they faced considerable 
incentives to minimize the hours allocated to public work.65 There was another 
avenue of enforcement, though; until the second half of the nineteenth century, 
many criminal cases were brought by private parties.66 If anything, a system of 
private enforcement seems likely to produce even more sporadic and unpre-
dictable enforcement than one of public prosecution, and indeed that is the sto-
ry reported by numerous historical studies. It was in part the perceived ineffi-
ciencies and arbitrariness of private prosecutions that led the United States to 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Nor is it a complaint limited to the United States. Various studies document selective enforce-
ment in other countries across various time periods. See, e.g., Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and 
the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENG-
LAND 17, 21–59 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (analyzing strategic selective enforcement in eight-
eenth-century England); Teemu Ruskola, Note, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing 
and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 2531, 2564 (1994) (discussing selective enforcement in the 
People’s Republic of China regarding various sex offenses). 
 62 The irregularities of criminal law enforcement led Elizabeth Dale to characterize criminal law 
in America’s first 150 years as “far more a government of men than one of laws . . . .” DALE, supra 
note 27, at 5. But Dale’s very formulation assumes the idealized conception of criminal law that de-
veloped over the twentieth century. See infra Part II. 
 63 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 28–29. 
 64 See generally JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 
(1980). 
 65 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 42–43 (2003); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to 
Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 446 (2009). 
 66 See, e.g., Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecu-
tion, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 568, 570 (1984). 
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establish public prosecutors earlier and much more widely than other western 
democracies.67 
As private prosecutions waned, selective enforcement changed its form 
but did not disappear. First, even as staffing and resources for public prosecu-
tion increased, full or near-full enforcement remained impossible, given the 
breadth of substantive prohibitions and the frequency with which they are vio-
lated.68 Second, as criminal law became increasingly codified in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the sources of discretion shifted. As emphasized 
in the previous Section, it is important both to note criminal law’s transition 
from a (partly) common-law field to one in which almost all offenses are de-
fined by statute, and also to avoid overemphasizing the consequences of that 
transition. Common law gave both prosecutors and courts discretion. Codifica-
tion may limit judicial discretion to a degree, but it has not limited prosecutori-
al discretion much, and may have expanded it. Statutory offenses have long 
been so numerous, and have reached so much ordinary conduct, that law en-
forcement agents do not need common-law crimes to enjoy wide discretion 
about who to prosecute.69 In 1940, in the waning years of common-law crimes 
but well before any supposed legislative backlash to the Warren Court could 
have expanded criminal codes, then-Attorney General Robert Jackson ob-
served that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation 
than any other person in America.”70 
2. Expansions of Capacity 
The introduction and expansion of municipal police forces also increased 
both enforcement capacity and opportunities for discretion. This particular ex-
pansion of discretion was likely deliberate, because American police forces 
developed in response to perceived needs for crisis management and social 
coordination, not strictly problems related to the detection and investigation of 
substantive offenses. Immigration and industrialization brought rapid changes 
to American cities in the early decades of the republic, and by the 1820s and 
1830s, the upheavals were manifest in frequent riots, racial and ethnic con-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 92–93; JACOBY, supra note 64, at 3–43. 
 68 See Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional 
Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 775 (1996) (“[T]here has been no time in our history when we had . . . 
sufficient resources for police, prosecutors, and judges.”). 
 69 See VOGEL, supra note 27, at 33 (providing a sample of cases from the Boston Police Court 
between 1830 and 1860 that reflect the criminalization of the following ordinary activities: “remaining 
open past 10 p.m.,” “removing house offal against by-laws,” “keeping swine in street,” “driving horse 
to left of center,” “horse at large,” “sidewalk iced more than 6 hrs.,” and so on). See generally 
GOLUBOFF, supra note 40. 
 70 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 
(1940). 
1968 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1949 
flicts, and sometimes violent protests by laborers.71 Police forces were intro-
duced to address these problems, with a focus on prevention.72 The new police 
departments undoubtedly increased enforcement capacity far beyond a system 
reliant on private complaints.73 
From the outset, policing was highly discretionary and selective, some-
times due to strategic choices to focus on particular problems and ignore oth-
ers, sometimes due to officers’ biases or lack of enthusiasm.74 American police 
forces have never been subject to the top-down constraints that are common in 
other countries.75 Policing was highly politicized, and controversial, through-
out the nineteenth century.76 Calls to reform the police emerged early, with an 
initial focus on professionalization that evolved into other themes, such as in-
creased democratization, as police forces grew and changed.77 Through each 
era of American policing, discretion has played a significant role. Police offic-
ers have long been expected to manage an array of problems, not all of which 
are captured in criminal statutes, and they have never been expected to detect 
every violation and apprehend every violator.78 
Enforcement capacity grew as prosecutors and police forces grew in 
number and in professionalization, and with this increased capacity came more 
exercises of discretion. But it is important to see that it is the increased capaci-
ty, rather than any profound change in the content of criminal law, that ex-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 68–69; WALKER, supra note 34, at 
50–52. 
 72 See WALKER, supra note 34, at 52 (“The major change was that preventive patrol now became 
the central focus of law enforcement.”); Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & 
JUST. 547, 553 (1992) (tracing development of police to “a growing intolerance for riots and disorder, 
rather than a response to an increase in crime”). 
 73 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 70 (“Under the police regime . . . 
law enforcement became much less random, less haphazard. Prosecution, in the past, had depended 
very much on victims who made complaints. . . . [The police] became the real complainants—the 
prosecuting witnesses. This was very notably the case for ‘victimless crimes . . . .’”); ALEX S. VITALE, 
THE END OF POLICING 38 (2017) (“It was the creation of the police that made the widespread en-
forcement of vice laws and even the criminal code possible for the first time.”). 
 74 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 70; VITALE, supra note 73, at 
38–39; WALKER, supra note 34, at 57–60; see also WALKER, supra note 34, at 66 (“It is unlikely that 
the police did much to prevent crime and disorder . . . . There were simply too few officers, spread too 
thin, spending too much of their time avoiding work.”). 
 75 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 53–54; see also infra Part III. 
 76 See WALKER, supra note 34, at 64–65 (discussing the failure of nineteenth-century reform ef-
forts); id. at 131–37 (discussing police professionalization in the first decades of the twentieth century). 
 77 See generally DAVID A. SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008). 
 78 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 150 (“[T]he basic function of the 
police [was] to keep order in public places, [and] to deter crimes of disorder by patrolling urban spac-
es. People think of the police as crime-fighters; but order is, and probably was then, their prime 
goal.”); WALKER, supra note 72, at 58 (“Exercising broad discretion, [the nineteenth-century police 
officer] acted as a ‘roving local magistrate,’ settling disputes and solving other problems through his 
personal mediation.”). 
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panded the occasions for enforcement discretion. Here the country’s experi-
ment with Prohibition may be particularly instructive. Liquor manufacturing 
and distribution laws were selectively enforced in ways that were obvious to 
the American public; indeed, arbitrary enforcement was a major theme of the 
critiques of Prohibition that led to its eventual repeal.79 But several historians 
emphasize that Prohibition left a legacy far more important than any substan-
tive criminal statute: the institutional foundations of the federal carceral state.80 
It vastly expanded federal enforcement capacities, including surveillance and 
policing, and it led to the creation of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Prohibition 
also provided the occasion for many of the Supreme Court’s foundational 
Fourth Amendment decisions, which (in this era) nearly inevitably ruled in 
favor of the government’s asserted search and seizure authority and against 
individual defendants.81 In Lawrence Friedman’s memorable terms, “Prohibi-
tion is often described as a dead letter, but it was an extremely lively corpse.”82 
It certainly illustrates that expansions of enforcement authority can magnify, 
rather than reduce, practices of selective or arbitrary enforcement. 
3. The Elusive Jury and the Endurance of Guilty Pleas 
I have so far emphasized police and prosecutors, but adjudication is also 
part of the enforcement process. Contemporary critiques often emphasize 
prosecutorial discretion in the context of plea negotiations, contrasting convic-
tion by guilty pleas with the seeming gold standard of criminal adjudication: 
an adversarial trial before a jury. In that light, it is worth noting that convic-
tions secured through pleas are not a new development, and jury trials have 
never been the norm. In the early years of the republic, a substantial number of 
criminal convictions did result from trials, but these trials were very short pro-
ceedings in which defendants were typically unrepresented by counsel and de-
terminations of guilt were often made by a magistrate or other judicial offi-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN 
STATE 71 (2016) (discussing how Prohibition was enforced disproportionately in African American, 
poor, and immigrant communities); id. at 100–02 (describing the link between selective enforcement 
and opposition to Prohibition). 
 80 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 59–63; see also MCGIRR, supra note 79. 
 81 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that wiretapping defendant’s 
phone under suspicions of his illegal importation of alcohol did not violate defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. 
State of New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (affirming 
conviction for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act, and rejecting Fourth Amendment 
challenge); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (rejecting Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to search of automobile for contraband liquor). 
 82 FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 266. 
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cial.83 As defense counsel have become more prevalent, and even after defend-
ants have been afforded a constitutional right to counsel, jury trials have grown 
ever more rare.84 Guilty pleas produce almost all criminal convictions today, 
but they are not a recent development; they have produced the majority of 
criminal convictions for well over a century. 
4. Inequality Past and Present 
A final point of continuity is worth noting: enforcement discretion has 
long produced racial and socioeconomic disparities. The burdens of criminal 
law—police intrusions, arrests, convictions, and formal sanctions—have been 
directed disproportionately toward racial minorities and the poor throughout 
American history.85 Many factors contribute to these patterns, some solely a 
matter of enforcement and some related also to the content of substantive pro-
hibitions: it is easier for a wealthy person than a poor one to avoid both public 
drunkenness and detection of one’s public drunkenness.86 The magnitude and 
precise patterns of racial and socioeconomic disparities vary with time, and so 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See id. at 237–41. As a number of scholars have emphasized recently, common narratives of 
criminal law are based on a felony adjudication model, where jury trials are somewhat more common. 
But even for felonies, guilty pleas far outnumbered jury convictions at least by the end of the nine-
teenth century. See, e.g., Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 131, 131–32 (2005). 
 84 The introduction of defense counsel appears to have caused a brief uptick in the frequency with 
which defendants elected to go to trial, at least in some jurisdictions. But the increase was short-lived, 
as more frequent prosecutions and more crowded dockets counteracted the influence of defense coun-
sel. See James D. Rice, The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lawyers: Authority, Law, and Culture 
in Maryland Jury Trials, 1681–1837, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 455, 464 (1996); see also Raymond 
Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 97 (1928) (discussing the marked decline in the 
frequency of criminal trials). And for much of this country’s history, even when cases did go to jury 
trial, the jury became just another agent with discretion to decide outcomes, a maker (or “finder”) of 
law rather than a mechanical functionary of it. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function 
of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 423 (noting that early American juries were understood 
to have the power to determine questions of law, and arguing that this law-finding function lasted 
much longer in criminal cases than in civil ones). The view that a jury is permitted to determine facts 
but not law, and is strictly bound to apply preexisting law, was introduced throughout the nineteenth 
century and finally triumphed only in the twentieth century. Id. at 434–35. 
 85 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 84; WALKER, supra note 34, 
at 6. On a now standard account, the Supreme Court’s first major efforts to develop doctrines of con-
stitutional criminal procedure were efforts to address racial bias in enforcement. See Michael J. Klar-
man, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 48 (2000). 
 86 See, e.g., Martha A. Myers, Inequality and the Punishment of Minor Offenders in the Early 
20th Century, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 313–16 (1993); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1265–67 (1999) (discussing ways in 
which Fourth Amendment doctrine provides greater protection for the wealthy and encourages heavier 
policing of poor people and people of color). 
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too must the explanations.87 But it is important to recognize that evidence of 
great disparities can be found in every era in American criminal law.88 Racial-
ized enforcement is not a late twentieth-century invention. 
I have detailed the wide scope of substantive law and the importance of 
enforcement discretion as two separate phenomena, but of course they are re-
lated. It seems likely that the Unites States has been able to tolerate the broad 
substantive prohibitions described in the previous Section only because en-
forcement has been so incomplete. And it is certainly possible that the broad 
substantive prohibitions have sometimes been adopted precisely to give en-
forcers great leeway to choose their targets.89 But whatever the intentions be-
hind broad substantive law and very partial enforcement, this combination is 
the American criminal law tradition. The exceptionalist paradigm, in which 
criminal law is targeted to address a narrow range of especially serious prob-
lems, and in which substantive laws rather than enforcement agents determine 
who will be labeled a criminal, has never been a reality. Political scientist Ma-
rie Gottschalk has suggested that “more than in other areas of American histo-
ry and politics, we have incredible amnesia when it comes to the history of 
crime and punishment.”90 I do not know if the amnesia is in fact worse with 
respect to crime and criminal law than in relation to other unpleasant aspects of 
our past, but it is certainly true that discussions of criminal law are often deep-
ly ahistorical.91 As Part II shows, discussions of criminal law are sometimes as 
resistant to present realities as they are to lessons from the past. 
                                                                                                                           
 87 For example, African Americans have long constituted a greater percentage of the prison popu-
lation than of the overall American population. But the degree to which African Americans are 
overrepresented among prisoners increased over the twentieth century. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 
6, at 169–70. 
 88 For one useful anthology of historical studies spanning almost three centuries, see 8 RACE, 
LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700–1990: RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Paul Finkelman ed., 
1992). The fifteen articles in this volume range across jurisdiction and time period, and none provides 
any reason to believe that criminal law was ever egalitarian. As Paul Finkelman puts it in the introduc-
tion to the volume, “these articles show how since the colonial period criminal prosecutions, discrimi-
nation in trial practices, and police activities have been used as mechanisms for racial control and 
subordination.” Id. at vii. Again, the relationship between race and crime varies with time, even if 
racially disparate enforcement is common across eras. Khalil Gibran Muhammad has traced ways in 
which criminality became increasingly dissociated from white immigrants and increasingly linked to 
black Americans after the Civil War. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNA-
TION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010). 
 89 Discretionary, selective enforcement of criminal laws is a model of governance that can stabi-
lize political authority under conditions of great economic or social inequality. This is Douglas Hay’s 
interpretation of the selective use of capital punishment in eighteenth-century England, and it is Mary 
Vogel’s reading of the emergence of plea bargaining in the United States. See Hay, supra note 61, at 
29–51; VOGEL, supra note 27, at vii–viii. 
 90 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 74. 
 91 Cf. Brown, supra note 26. 
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II. THE DREAM 
Given the realities of criminal legal practices discussed in Part I, it is per-
haps unsurprising that the institutions of criminal law have never produced 
much satisfaction.92 There is always too much crime, in popular perception, 
but also too many prohibitions of the wrong things; and there is never adequate 
enforcement. References to “failure,” “crisis,” or more interestingly, “col-
lapse,” suggesting a previously functional system, long predate the explosion 
of conviction and incarceration rates in the late twentieth century.93 But even if 
Americans are perpetually unhappy with criminal law in operation, they are 
also near-unanimous in their enthusiasm for the idea of criminal law—in their 
belief that a carefully crafted and properly administered criminal law is exactly 
what the word “justice” means. We cling to the dream that criminal law will 
solve various social problems, even after decade upon decade of disappoint-
ment. 
In this Part, I shift my focus from legal practices to legal ideas, with the 
ultimate goal of better understanding the relations between practices and ideas. 
In undertaking an intellectual history of mass incarceration, I aim to identify 
and examine the ideas about criminal law that informed the people who built 
the carceral state.94 Dissatisfied with actual practices but also confident in the 
                                                                                                                           
 92 This Article is focused on the United States, which surely faces unique criminal justice chal-
lenges. But other countries have their own reasons for complaints about criminal law. In a 1907 essay 
on the “general and well-grounded dissatisfaction with the administration of punitive justice in Amer-
ica,” Roscoe Pound discussed comparable critiques in European nations that extended back several 
centuries. See Roscoe Pound, Inherent and Acquired Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive 
Justice, 4 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 222, 222 (1908). “It is manifest, therefore, that dissatisfaction 
with criminal law and administration is not wholly a matter of time or place, but that there are inherent 
difficulties which must be reckoned with.” Id. at 223–24. 
 93 See, e.g., STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 2; Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational 
Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 453 (1928) (noting public interest in “the outcome of an alleged 
collapse of the administration of criminal justice in the American city”); see also JOHN BARKER 
WAITE, CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION 9 (1934) (referring to “the spectacular failures of criminal law in 
action,” and emphasizing the role of various enforcement agents). The critiques also came from out-
side the legal academy. In 1837, years before he became President and before the Civil War, a young 
Abraham Lincoln decried rampant violence and an “increasing disregard for law which pervades the 
country.” Mark E. Steiner, “The Sober Judgement of Courts:” Lincoln, Lawyers, and the Rule of Law, 
36 N. KY. L. REV. 279, 285 (2009). In 1909, President Taft declared that “[t]he administration of 
criminal law in this country is a disgrace to our civilization.” Eugene A. Gilmore, The Need of a Sci-
entific Study of Crime, Criminal Law, and Procedure—The American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 11 MICH. L. REV. 50, 50 (1913). Herbert Hoover’s inaugural address began with a dis-
cussion of “the failure of our system of criminal justice.” TONY PLATT, BEYOND THESE WALLS: RE-
THINKING CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (2019). 
 94 In this already long Article, I do not have space to discuss legal scholars’ lively discussions of 
the uses and possible abuses of intellectual history. I use the term intellectual history roughly as Wil-
liam Fisher defined it: “Intellectual history refers, broadly, to the history of what people have thought 
about and believed—inferred, most often, from what they have written.” William W. Fisher III, Texts 
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possibility of rational reform, American scholars began to develop and refine a 
new conceptual account of criminal law, description mixed with aspiration, 
asserting the unique function and operation of this area of law. That framework 
was articulated most clearly around midcentury, and it has structured the peda-
gogy and scholarly analysis of criminal law ever since. This Part examines the 
birth of the dream of a noble and just criminal law. 
A. Out of the Backwater 
There is always too much crime, but one curiosity of America’s “long 
nineteenth century,” roughly 1789 to 1920, is that crime appeared to decline 
steadily for many decades—and nonetheless, at the end of that period, experts 
and political leaders were especially critical of the state of criminal law.95 Per-
haps the relatively low crime rates enabled the criticisms; perhaps commenta-
tors became embarrassed by punishment precisely because the country seemed 
to have more of it than necessary. In any case, in the early twentieth century 
criminal law was a particular embarrassment to the burgeoning American legal 
academy. Influential legal thinkers such as Roscoe Pound, John Henry Wig-
more, and James Barr Ames envisioned important functions for legal scholar-
ship in tackling historical, empirical, and conceptual questions that practition-
ers and judges were ill-equipped to answer, and in “illuminating and simplify-
ing the law.”96 There were men ready to take on these tasks in many fields of 
private law, but criminal law was an “intellectual backwater,” an ugly stepsis-
ter in the law school curriculum and among leading legal scholars.97 As Roscoe 
                                                                                                                           
and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual Histo-
ry, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1997). One question raised by intellectual historians does have 
particular import for this Article: can or should this methodology make causal claims about past 
events? See Charles Barzun, Causation, Legal History, and Legal Doctrine, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 81, 81–
82 (2016). I address the question of whether and how ideas about criminal law may have contributed 
to mass incarceration in Part III. 
 95 C.f. THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, 
1789–1920 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). Crime data from this period is 
limited, but Samuel Walker synthesizes several historical studies that suggest “a U-shaped pattern in 
which crime rates were very high in the early nineteenth century as a consequence of the initial dis-
ruptive impact of industrialization and urbanization but then declined steadily over the next century.” 
WALKER, supra note 34, at 68. Crime rates rose again after World War II, thus creating the U-shape. 
Id. 
 96 JAMES BARR AMES, THE VOCATION OF THE LAW PROFESSOR (1901), reprinted in LECTURES 
ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354, 366–67 (Humphrey Milford ed., 
1913). 
 97 According to one (very opinionated) survey of American criminal law scholarship from the 
colonial period through 1966, Harvard Law School took a “negative attitude” toward Joel Prentiss 
Bishop, author of early comprehensive studies of American criminal law, and toward criminal law 
more generally in the nineteenth century, perhaps delaying the development of this field. See GER-
HARD O.W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE SCHOLARS 69 (1969). Mueller identifies Joseph Beale, 
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Pound saw it, the field had been “all but left . . . to charlatans,”98 and America 
needed someone to “do for the substantive law of crimes what Wigmore did 
for the law of evidence and Williston for contracts.”99 
To emphasize, it was something called substantive criminal law that 
Pound and others identified as the site of intellectual neglect and scholarly op-
portunity. That itself was an innovation. Beyond criminal law and in early 
twentieth-century legal thought more generally, a separation of substantive law 
from procedure was still a relatively recent conceptual development.100 With 
the separation came a subordination: whereas substantive law had previously 
been merely “secreted in the interstices of procedure,” in Henry Maine’s fa-
mous formulation, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century jurists often 
asserted the normative and conceptual priority of substantive law.101 In the 
newly developed vision, procedure was supposed to serve as a handmaid to, 
                                                                                                                           
Jr. of Harvard as “the first criminal law professor who aspired to scholarly accomplishment,” but finds 
that Beale left criminal law woefully undertheorized, as we would say today. “[Beale] gave an inordi-
nate amount of attention to the specific offenses and tended to avoid the general principles. . . . His 
articles were logical but, frankly, lacked imagination.” Id. at 59. Meanwhile, over at Northwestern, 
Dean Wigmore was a successful “organizer of American criminology” but less successful in generat-
ing sophisticated studies of criminal law. Id. at 78–81; see also David Wolitz, Herbert Wechsler, Le-
gal Process, and the Jurisprudential Roots of the Model Penal Code, 51 TULSA L. REV. 633, 642 
(2016) (“American substantive criminal law in the 1930s was considered an intellectual backwater.”). 
 98 Roscoe Pound, What Can Law Schools Do for Criminal Justice?, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 127, 132 
(1927). 
 99 Sheldon Glueck, Roscoe Pound and Criminal Justice, 10 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 299, 300 
(1964). Glueck is paraphrasing Pound, supra note 98, at 128. Herbert Wechsler would later repeat the 
theme, also invoking Wigmore and Williston as inspiration, when he volunteered himself as the intel-
lectual architect of substantive criminal law. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal 
Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952). Though Roscoe Pound wrote extensively on criminal law 
(and many other subjects), he wrote primarily about enforcement and administration, and called for 
someone else to reexamine the underlying conceptual structure of substantive prohibitions. See, e.g., 
Pound, supra note 98, at 129 (“[C]riminal law is substantially the only important branch of American 
law which has not been affected powerfully and affected for the better by some textbook written by a 
great teacher of law and embodying the results of his teaching and of his study.”); see also MUELLER, 
supra note 97, at 111 (“Mephistopheles-like, Dean Pound had to shout three times at America’s crim-
inal law professors before he succeeded in tearing them away from their preoccupation with producing 
dry copies of case reports . . . .”). 
 100 Several scholars trace the roots of a substance-procedure dichotomy to William Blackstone, 
who did not rely on those precise terms but who did separate legal rights and wrongs from methods of 
enforcement. See, e.g., LINDSAY FARMER, MAKING THE MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2016) (identi-
fying Blackstone as the first thinker to develop “a freestanding account of the substantive [criminal] 
law as a body of rules divorced from procedural technicalities”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Con-
quered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 929–30 (1987). Blackstone’s student, Jeremy Bentham, articulated more clearly a distinc-
tion between substantive law and “adjective law.” See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 308 
(H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970). The works of both men, published late in the eighteenth century, were influ-
ential throughout nineteenth century America. 
 101 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1891). 
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and not the mistress of, substantive law, and substantive law was itself equated 
with justice.102 
The calls for a new intellectual framework for substantive criminal law 
eventually produced significant changes to both pedagogy and scholarship, 
which then influenced legal doctrine and practice as the field became populat-
ed with attorneys and judges educated under the new framework. One im-
portant step was an influential textbook first published in 1940 and widely 
used for decades after, notwithstanding the authors’ failure to issue a second or 
subsequent edition.103 Criminal Law and Its Administration by Jerome Michael 
and Herbert Wechsler was actually not much about “administration;” the book 
was explicit in its efforts to conceptualize substantive law independently of 
procedure, to subordinate procedure to substance, and to combine positive de-
scription with more evaluative reflections.104 The authors used the term “ad-
ministration” to describe enforcement procedures, and they made clear that 
administration was simply the means to achieve substantive ends.105 In this 
                                                                                                                           
 102 The handmaid/mistress formulation appeared in a 1938 speech by Charles Clark, Dean of Yale 
Law School and author of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but Clark borrowed the mistress and 
handmaid juxtaposition from a 1907 British opinion. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 
WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938). For further discussion of the conception of procedure as handmaid to 
substance, see infra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. Stephen Subrin suggests that the elevation 
of substantive law over procedure was partly a result of changes in legal education: As “treatises and 
law schools replaced apprenticing as the preferred method of learning to practice law,” legal thinking 
became “disembodied . . . from practical considerations that are more obvious when one learns by 
doing.” Subrin, supra note 100, at 929. 
 103 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Teaching Criminal Law, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 279 (2009) (re-
porting that when he started teaching in 1965, he thought Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler’s 
1940 casebook was the “obvious” choice and adopted it, even though it was twenty-five years old). 
For a detailed account of the origins of the Michael and Wechsler casebook and its effect on criminal 
law pedagogy, see Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political Histo-
ry of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009). Michael died in 1953, and 
Wechsler was asked to oversee the drafting of the Model Penal Code around the same time, so plans 
for a second edition were abandoned. Id. at 236–37. The new approach in the casebook had helped 
establish Wechsler’s reputation and almost certainly influenced the American Law Institute’s selec-
tion of him as the Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code. See id. 
 104 See generally JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMIN-
ISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND COMMENTARIES (1940). Anders Walker’s history of this book 
and its legacy focuses on the authors’ hostility toward the Langdellian case method, which Michael 
and Wechsler saw as overly formalistic and deferential to judges, and insufficiently engaged with 
broad policy questions and insights from social science. See Walker, supra note 103, at 226–30. 
Without contesting those aspects of the book’s new approach, I think the authors’ conceptualization of 
the substance-procedure relationship was equally if not more important. Moreover, Walker portrays 
the book’s embrace of normative questions as primarily a turn toward critique that invited students to 
identify weaknesses of existing law. As I explain in this Section, however, the book is designed as a 
normative justification for criminal law—perhaps not in its existing form, but in some not-too-distant 
model. 
 105 The authors acknowledged that administration was sometimes “collaterally” relevant to sub-
stantive criminal law, but only collaterally. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 104, at v. The last 
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vision, substantive law was not something that emerged from the interstices of 
enforcement procedures; instead, procedures operated in the shadow of and in 
the service of a vision of substantive justice. 
When this book appeared in 1940, criminal law was still a disfavored sub-
ject in law schools, a “grimy” (and not profitable) field that few students want-
ed to enter and few law schools wanted to encourage their students to enter.106 
Notably, Michael and Wechsler did not aspire to encourage or prepare students 
to practice criminal law.107 Instead, they thought that a criminal law course 
could serve as a vehicle to raise broad questions about statecraft and public 
policy. They wanted to bring dignity to the criminal law course, but that digni-
ty was not to be found in prosecuting or representing criminal defendants—
defendants whose essential griminess, it must be said, was not much ques-
tioned by these authors.108 Instead, Wechsler stepped away from the details of 
enforcement and articulated a more abstract vision of criminal law as the 
backbone of civilized society. In the casebook and in other works, he advanced 
a vision more utilitarian than retributive, one that emphasized both the risks 
and benefits of criminal law.109 But Wechsler was sure that these risks were 
worth taking. He depicted criminal law as neither intellectual backwater nor 
the messy management of grimy wrongdoers, but as the most important law of 
all: 
Whatever views one holds about the penal law, no one will question 
its importance in society. This is the law on which men place their 
ultimate reliance for protection against all the deepest injuries that 
human conduct can inflict on individuals and institutions. . . . If pe-
nal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in jeopardy. 
If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a gross injustice on 
those caught within its toils. The law that carries such responsibili-
ties should surely be as rational and just as law can be. Nowhere in 
                                                                                                                           
section of the last chapter addressed “administrative problems,” spanning search and seizure, entrap-
ment, third degree, fair trial, and double jeopardy in less than 100 pages of a textbook over 1200 pages 
long. Id. at 1178. 
 106 See generally Walker, supra note 103. 
 107 See id. at 218–19. Contemporaneous reviews of the Michael and Wechsler casebook praised 
its orientation away from the concerns of practitioners. Ironically, Roscoe Pound was one of the 
book’s few vocal critics. 
 108 Michael and Wechsler allowed that empirical research did not yet “enable us to distinguish 
criminals from non-criminals in terms of their essential characteristics,” but expressed hope for pro-
gress in this area. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 104, at 24. No one else has yet discovered these 
“essential characteristics,” but that has not stopped the development of an essential view in which 
criminality is a property of an individual rather than a status bestowed by the state. 
 109 Wechsler, supra note 99, at 1098 (“Its promise as an instrument of safety is matched only by 
its power to destroy.”). 
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the entire legal field is more at stake for the community or for the 
individual.110 
This passage, published in 1952 as Wechsler introduced his plans for the 
Model Penal Code, reflects the basic vision that I characterize as criminal law 
exceptionalism.111 In this model, criminal law targets a narrow set of specific 
problems (“the deepest injuries”) with a distinctive set of interventions, and 
society has no other recourse for these problems than criminal law. Wechsler 
was hardly the first person to proclaim the fundamental social importance of 
criminal law and punishment. But as an influential scholar, teacher, and drafter 
of a model code, he was able to deploy that normative vision as both critique 
of and apology for actual legal institutions. He identified many ways in which 
existing law was irrational, but he tried to demonstrate that the problems could 
be fixed; criminal law could be made into the grand and essential instrument 
that society so desperately needed. And importantly, this reform project began 
with substantive law, or, still more strongly, counted as law only the substan-
tive definitions of crimes and not the enforcement process. Wechsler acknowl-
edged that under existing practices, enforcement discretion determined out-
comes. But much like today’s critics of prosecutorial and police discretion, he 
saw “domination by administration” as a curable illness, not as the usual, 
juristypical state of affairs.112 This vision was premised on the assumption that 
once we chose well what to criminalize and defined crimes properly, enforce-
ment procedures could be designed to vindicate rather than defeat those sub-
stantive choices. 
At the risk of making the Michael and Wechsler textbook seem itself the 
turning point, rather than one example of a broader intellectual shift, it is worth 
highlighting a few aspects of the book beyond its substance-procedure distinc-
tion. In promulgating a conceptual architecture through which to understand 
American criminal law, Michael and Wechsler made a few key choices that 
should sound familiar to anyone who has taken or taught a substantive criminal 
law course since 1940. Whereas the prior leading textbook had covered an ar-
ray of specific offenses, Michael and Wechsler chose homicide as the primary 
crime through which to teach criminal law concepts and devoted the first and 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. 
 111 The quoted passage is Wechsler alone, without his casebook coauthor, which could explain its 
stronger claim of criminal law exceptionalism. The casebook coauthored with Jerome Michael is more 
skeptical about the unique importance of criminal law: “[T]he criminal law can not be viewed in prop-
er perspective unless it is remembered that making behavior criminal and treating criminals are only 
one of many methods that the state can and does employ in order to regulate social life; that the crimi-
nal law must not be considered in isolation of other methods of social control, especially education 
. . . .” MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 104, at 20. 
 112 Wechsler, supra note 99, at 1101–02. 
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longest chapter to this topic.113 They then gave brief attention to a few other 
physically violent offenses and to serious property offenses, and they all but 
ignored misdemeanors, petty offenses, and regulatory crimes.114 Drunken-
ness—the “plankton of the criminal sea,” according to historians115—was ad-
dressed primarily as a potential defense, and barely warranted mention as a 
crime.116 Indeed, the chapter on intoxication was just one instance of the 
book’s extensive analysis of mental states and volitional capacity, topics still 
central to the first-year criminal law course as it is usually taught. All told, the 
book depicted criminal law as a matter of carefully crafted, individualized 
judgments about dangerous and ill-intentioned persons who inflicted grave 
social harms—much as Wechsler would later describe the field as he launched 
the effort to write a model code, and much as casebook authors see the field 
today.117 
Indeed, though other academics would develop new casebooks over sub-
sequent decades, they nearly invariably “built on [the] basic model” estab-
lished by Michael and Wechsler, often with open acknowledgment of their 
debt.118 At most American law schools, substantive criminal law is a required 
first-year course, and judging by the casebooks in use, students are still taught 
that the substance of criminal law resides in judicial opinions and statutes, not 
the decisions of enforcement officials such as police and prosecutors. Beyond 
the casebooks and classrooms, criminal law scholarship did indeed escape its 
                                                                                                                           
 113 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 104, at 25–289 (Chapter 1: Homicide). Before Michael 
and Wechsler published their book, the leading criminal law textbook was JOSEPH H. BEALE, A SE-
LECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1928), which has been 
criticized as giving “an inordinate amount of attention to the specific offenses and tend[ing] to avoid 
the general principles.” MUELLER, supra note 97, at 59. 
 114 In a chapter called “Social Protection Against Dangerous Persons,” the book did include a 
section on “vagrants, disorderly persons, and ‘public enemies.’” MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 
104, at 1008–54. I am grateful to this section for bringing to my attention Thurman Arnold’s remarka-
ble article on the concept of “law enforcement,” discussed below. Michael and Wechsler include a 
long passage from Arnold’s article, but do not add their own comments or questions. See id. at 1051–
53. 
 115 See FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27. 
 116 See MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 104, at 903–20 (Chapter 9: The Significance of Intox-
ication). But see id. at 1054 (reproducing an Italian statute on the sentencing of “habitual drunkards”). 
 117 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Essay, The Changing Market for Criminal Law Casebooks, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2016) (“Criminal law is a nasty business. The field takes as its point of 
departure the indignities that human beings visit upon each other—each one worse than the one be-
fore. A book or article about criminal law often reads like a parade of horribles, an indictment of hu-
manity’s descent into moral weakness. . . . Neither the business disputes of contract law nor the physi-
cal injuries described in a torts casebook can compare with the depravity of what we teach in criminal 
law.”). Ohlin’s essay reviews existing casebooks and introduces his own, which purports to offer “a 
fresh but flexible approach” through shorter chapters and more summaries of doctrine, but which 
otherwise replicates the structure and topics of existing casebooks. See id. at 1168–72. 
 118 Walker, supra note 103, at 238–44. 
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reputation as an intellectual backwater, flourishing to span a wide range of top-
ics and methodological approaches. But that otherwise wide-ranging scholar-
ship rarely questions or transcends the pedagogy in which the scholars were 
trained. Thus, the dominant account of criminal law remains the one portrayed 
in Michael and Wechsler’s textbook: a firm substance-procedure distinction in 
which process is supposed to serve the ends defined by substantive law, not 
vice versa; the reliance on homicide as the paradigm offense; and a deep sense 
that criminal law is both fundamentally important and capable of being made 
rational and just.119 
Readers who themselves subscribe to these principles may believe that 
they have dominated scholarly thought because they are right, or because they 
are the most empirically or normatively defensible accounts of criminal law. In 
that light, it is worth recalling another way of seeing things. Even as the sub-
stance-procedure distinction became increasingly influential in the first half of 
the twentieth century, it was attacked by legal realists. In a pair of 1932 arti-
cles, Thurman Arnold, then a Yale Law School professor who would go on to 
serve in Roosevelt’s administration and then to found the firm Arnold & Por-
ter, mocked the substance-procedure distinction and hierarchy and the related 
“creed” of Law Enforcement.120 Arnold argued that the difference between 
substantive law and procedure existed “only in attitude.”121 The creed that un-
                                                                                                                           
 119 An exception may prove the general point. Consider Lloyd Weinreb’s explanation of the cen-
tral way in which his own casebook, otherwise inspired by Michael and Wechsler, differs from their 
project: 
[T]he Michael and Wechsler casebook is premised on the assumption that the criminal 
law is—or should be and could be—a product of reason, that it is possible to shape the 
law to achieve ends that commend themselves to reasonable persons, by means that are 
likewise rationally defensible. Michael and Wechsler did not suppose that either ends or 
means were uncontroversial, still less self-evident. But they believed that careful, con-
scientious reflection, unswayed by blinkered vision or special pleading, would lead to 
an outcome that reasonable people generally would—and should—regard as acceptable. 
The casebook was intended to set students on that path. I do not share that confidence 
in the power of reason. On the contrary, I believe that the proper aims of the criminal 
law do not fit easily together and that no amount of ratiocination will overcome their ill 
fit . . . . The solutions that we adopt are inevitably a product not of reason but of experi-
ence ratified by convention. 
Weinreb, supra note 103, at 284. Weinreb’s casebook was indeed less laudatory of criminal law than 
other books—“I see no value in presenting the criminal law ‘without its warts,’” he wrote—but his 
book has never dominated American pedagogy, and Weinreb stopped updating it after the 2003 edi-
tion. See id. at 291; see also LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed. 2003). 
 120 Thurman Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 1 
(1932) [hereinafter Arnold, Law Enforcement]; Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and 
Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643–47 (1932) [hereinafter Arnold, The Role 
of Substantive Law]. 
 121 “Substantive law is canonized procedure. Procedure is unfrocked substantive law.” Arnold, 
The Role of Substantive Law, supra note 120, at 645. 
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derlay continual calls for better and more complete law enforcement was based 
on “a feeling that criminal justice is both impartial and impersonal—that prin-
ciples instead of personal discretion control the actions of judges and prosecu-
tors.”122 This ideal had “no objective truth,” Arnold announced, though it did 
have “emotional value.”123 Arnold was a realist and not a dreamer, but he could 
see the dream’s psychological appeal. 
Legal realism would, of course, have a profound influence and lasting 
legacy across most fields of law. The significance of enforcement discretion, 
both judicial and executive, would become a major inquiry among the Legal 
Process school, arguably heirs to the realists.124 But Arnold and other realists 
would leave little impact on criminal law. At a time when other doctrinal areas 
were leaving formalism behind, criminal law found dignity at midcentury by 
adopting the formalist claim that “the law” resides in substance, not enforce-
ment, and that the law can be fixed and determinate prior to enforcement deci-
sions.125 
B. Between Reality and Dream 
There was, of course, still the inconvenient reality of actual criminal law 
practices, which stubbornly refused to conform with the vision articulated by 
Wechsler and others. But that reality proved no obstacle, because criminal law 
exceptionalism has always condemned specific practices even as it justifies the 
institutions of criminal law in the abstract. Indeed, the dualism with which we 
speak and think about criminal law, sliding perpetually between descriptive 
claims and normative aspirations, is part of what has made the intellectual 
framework discussed here so enduring. Criminal law exceptionalism has prov-
                                                                                                                           
 122 Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 120, at 6. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See generally Geoffrey C. Shaw, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process 
School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666, 728 (2013) (analyzing H.L.A. Hart’s lost essay about discretion). 
 125 In the past few decades, other scholars have occasionally made this same observation about 
criminal law. Unfortunately, their insights have not much disrupted the noble dream. See, e.g., Louis 
D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1269–
72 (1996); Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal 
Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 103 (1996) (“[A]lthough realism’s 
lessons for criminal law seem obvious, formalism continues to dominate criminal jurisprudence.”); 
Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 521, 522 (1992) (“The common law discourse of criminal law scholarship has not yet suffi-
ciently suffered critiques supplied by positivism or realism to be a ready object for the postmodern 
critiques directed at positivism or realism.”). Seidman sees efforts to escape criminal law formalism as 
futile. “[I]f the criminal law became realist, it would no longer be the criminal law. Criminal law is 
that portion of our legal system defined by the practice of blaming. That practice, in turn, necessarily 
entails a formalist world view complete with its emphasis on individualism, freedom of choice, and 
adjudicatory models of justice. To give up on this world view is to give up on criminal law altogether 
and to replace it with something else.” Seidman, supra, at 160. 
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en immune to historical or empirical contradiction, because the failures of ac-
tual practices to conform to the model are repeatedly diagnosed as isolated pa-
thologies. Criminal law’s dignity is preserved by continual intellectual efforts 
to divide, prune, and purge, to label any troublesome features or areas of law 
as missteps or distortions. The underlying assumption is that there is some 
“core” of criminal law that is true and good and noble, if we would but clear 
away the overgrowth and disease. 
A paradigm example of this effort, and a classic statement of criminal law 
exceptionalism, is also apparently the most-cited substantive criminal law arti-
cle of all time: The Aims of the Criminal Law by Henry M. Hart, Jr.126 First 
published in 1958, the article was based on mimeographed materials prepared 
for first-year law students, and as such, it proclaimed both to be “elementary” 
but also not obliged to engage much with “competing views.”127 Henry Hart 
was a canon-builder in other areas of public law. He coauthored a celebrated 
federal courts casebook with Wechsler that is still credited with defining the 
field. He also prepared with Albert Sacks the Legal Process teaching materials 
that educated a generation of lawyers and framed a major jurisprudential 
school.128 Hart’s overall reputation rests more on those materials than on this 
single essay, which seems to have been more quietly but no less profoundly 
influential.129 The Michael and Wechsler casebook had introduced an intellec-
tual paradigm that brought dignity to criminal law; Hart would refine that par-
adigm by developing the principles of criminal law exceptionalism. Both the 
Michael and Wechsler casebook and Hart’s article were written and widely 
used as teaching documents, a fact of no small import. A few generations of 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 401. This article is sixty-sixth on a 1996 list of most-cited 
law review articles of all time; it is one of only a few criminal law articles on that list, and the only 
one to focus on substantive criminal law rather than criminal procedure. See Fred R. Shapiro, The 
Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767 tbl.1 (1996). 
 127 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 401 n.*. 
 128 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM (1953). This book is still updated and in print, now as RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (7th ed. 2015). The Legal Pro-
cess materials were published only posthumously. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LE-
GAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Arguably, Hart was the most influential American legal scholar of 
the twentieth century: he has the most pieces on the list of the most-cited law review articles, and as 
the compiler of that list notes, Hart’s influence extends beyond the articles to include the federal 
courts and legal process casebooks. See Shapiro, supra note 126, at 761. 
 129 To say it has been influential is not necessarily to claim that it was original. Given Hart’s work 
with Herbert Wechsler and other midcentury legal scholars, I have not attempted to discover which 
specific individuals are most to credit, or to blame, for the vision of criminal law expressed in The 
Aims of the Criminal Law. Whether one believes that article to be the origin or a mere reflection of 
criminal law exceptionalism, it is an especially clear illustration. 
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American lawyers—practitioners, judges, and academics—were taught to 
think of criminal law within this paradigm. 
Strikingly, Hart began with a pluralist and seemingly anti-exceptionalist 
vision of criminal law, emphasizing the wide array of purposes motivating 
criminal laws and the continuities between criminal law and other types of 
law.130 That introduction turned out to be a red herring. After less than two 
pages articulating this pluralist view, Hart proceeded over the next forty pages 
to explain the ways in which criminal law was distinct, and the specific and 
limited purposes served by this distinctive form of law. In other words, after 
the introduction, Hart advanced a vision of criminal law exceptionalism. Be-
ginning with positive description, Hart noted that criminal law was constituted 
of generally applicable commands backed by sanctions, but that alone did not 
distinguish it from much of civil law.131 Still, criminal law had to be distin-
guished from civil law, Hart seemed to believe. To say that “a crime is any-
thing which is called a crime” would be a demonstration of “intellectual bank-
ruptcy.”132 Setting up a subtle transition from straight description to a norma-
tive theory of justification, Hart found the distinctive attribute of criminal law 
to lie in “the moral condemnation of the community” that was expressed in a 
criminal sanction—and in the tendency of criminal sanctions to involve the 
threat or imposition of “unpleasant physical consequences.”133 This is a claim 
of burdens exceptionalism that initially sounds descriptive, but Hart married it 
to a normative claim. “What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and 
all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condem-
nation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”134 
The emphasis on the language of justification is mine, not Hart’s. 
Throughout The Aims of the Criminal Law, Hart moved between description 
and aspiration, between an often critical assessment of existing practices and a 
grand vision of properly ordered criminal justice, and he rarely flagged his 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 401 (“A penal code that reflected only a single basic 
principle would be a very bad one. Social purposes can never be single or simple, or held unqualified-
ly to the exclusion of all other social purposes . . . .”); id. at 402 (“In the criminal law, as in all law, 
questions about the action to be taken do not present themselves for decision in an institutional vacu-
um.”). In the latter passage, Hart implicitly invoked the idea of “institutional settlement” that is central 
to Legal Process theory. Holding fast to the Legal Process framework might have led Hart to a very 
different account of criminal law, one that understands “law” as what emerges from a complex pro-
cess extending across several institutions, including enforcement institutions. As Louis Bilionis has 
observed, however, Hart abandoned the Legal Process approach as an account of criminal law after 
the first pages of this article. Bilionis, supra note 125, at 1275. 
 131 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 403. 
 132 Id. at 404. 
 133 Id. at 404–05. 
 134 Id. at 404 (emphasis added). 
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transitions.135 After identifying the unique condemnation attached to a criminal 
conviction—which, I should be clear, seems clearly accurate as a sociological 
description of typical practice—Hart proceeded to describe criminal conduct as 
uniquely blameworthy, and criminal law as uniquely necessary. I have charac-
terized these latter claims as subject-matter exceptionalism. 
In sweeping language, Hart claimed that criminal law was uniquely es-
sential to society’s very existence. He suggested that criminal law performed 
the necessary task of teaching humans how to coexist peacefully: “[T]he crim-
inal law has an obviously significant and, indeed, a fundamental role to play in 
the effort to create the good society. For it is the criminal law which defines the 
minimum conditions of man’s responsibility to his fellows and holds him to 
that responsibility.”136 Hart compared the operation of criminal law to “the 
training of a child in the small circle of the family,” but otherwise did not seem 
to take seriously the possibility that caregiving relationships, schools, church-
es, civic associations, social movements, speech in the public sphere, literature, 
art, cultural institutions, political institutions, friendships, business relation-
ships, workplaces, and of course civil laws might be as or more important in 
defining and communicating humans’ shared expectations of one another.137 In 
a footnote, Hart acknowledged the existence of what he called obliquely “other 
agencies of social discipline,” but he did not specify the agencies he had in 
mind, and he then proclaimed that “the criminal law is the only one which 
speaks to the individual formally and solemnly in behalf of the whole socie-
ty.”138 
Even when Hart’s article was first published, its purportedly descriptive 
claims were inconsistent with existing practice in several ways. In reality, 
criminal law does not speak to individuals at all, except through its enforcers: 
as Hart acknowledged elsewhere in the article, ordinary citizens do not read 
                                                                                                                           
 135 With a specific emphasis on Hart’s call for constitutional limitations on substantive criminal 
law, Louis Bilionis has noted how much Hart glossed or edited existing practices to defend his pur-
portedly descriptive claims, and also has noted that many followers have adopted Hart’s approach: 
Hart’s argument offers an exercise in what might be called “perfectionist generalizing,” 
by which I mean the kind of legal argument that claims to extract a fundamental princi-
ple from a milieu held relevant to constitutional law—[such as] text, history and tradi-
tion, or precedent—but that cannot make the principle and milieu fit without generaliz-
ing the former and idealizing the latter. This style of argument later came to dominate 
legal scholarship concerned with the relationship between the Constitution and the 
criminal sanction . . . . 
Bilionis, supra note 125, at 1277; see also id. at 1278 (“[A]s a descriptive matter, Hart’s picture [of 
criminalization limited to acts of moral blameworthiness] resembles the evolving practice and experi-
ence of criminal law only if you set aside the countless occasions when the precept is not observed.”). 
 136 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 410. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 410 n.24. 
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criminal statutes and the operation of criminal law does not pretend that they 
do.139 Contra Hart, no criminal statute intones, “do not murder, rape, or rob.”140 
Instead, criminal statutes are nearly always framed as decision rules directed at 
enforcement agents: they specify conditions under which public officials are 
authorized to initiate prosecution and impose punishment.141 And as Part I il-
lustrated, criminal sanctions had long been applied to a wide range of conduct, 
much of it not terribly socially harmful. What was new at midcentury was the 
characterization of those broad prohibitions as “overcriminalization.” Though 
Hart did not coin that term, it emerged around the same time as his paper and 
reflects a similar subject-matter exceptionalism.142 
Enforcement realities also required special agility from Hart. His norma-
tive account required enforcement discretion “to be reduced to the minimum,” 
but he did not deny the wide discretion held by actual enforcers, which gives 
them “the de facto power of determining what the criminal law in action shall 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See id. at 421 (discussing ignorance of law, and observing that “the criminal law as a device 
for getting people to know about statutes and interpret them correctly is a device of dubious and large-
ly unproved effectiveness”). 
 140 Id. at 403 (“Mostly, the commands of the criminal law are ‘must-nots,’ or prohibitions, which 
can be satisfied by inaction. ‘Do not murder, rape, or rob.’ But some of them are ‘musts,’ or affirma-
tive requirements, which can be satisfied only by taking a specifically . . . described kind of action. 
‘Support your wife and children,’ and ‘File your income tax return.’”). Hart cited to his own Legal 
Process materials, but to no actual statute. Here is a typical robbery statute: “A person commits the 
offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from 
the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon . . . . A person con-
victed of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by im-
prisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-41 (2019). The pro-
vision for capital punishment is unconstitutional and not enforceable under current Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine. But the basic structure of this law—identifying the acts or omissions, mental state, and 
other conditions that constitute an offense, and then authorizing state officials to impose a penalty—is 
typical of criminal statutes. The same structure characterizes omission offenses, such as the willful 
failure to file tax returns. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1801 (McKinney 2009). 
 141 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Meir Dan-Cohen’s famous article on decision 
rules and conduct rules began with a cursory rejection of Hans Kelsen’s claim that all laws were effec-
tively decision rules. Kelsen had pointed out that in a law formulated as “One shall not steal; if [one] 
steals, he shall be punished,” it was the second provision that does all the work. In Dan-Cohen’s view, 
H.L.A. Hart had already effectively refuted Kelsen’s argument: “[B]y eliminating the independent 
function that the substantive rules of the criminal law have in guiding behavior, Kelsen’s view fails to 
account for the difference between a fine and a tax.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct 
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (1984). It is not clear 
from Dan-Cohen’s brief discussion why he thought this was an effective response to Kelsen. Taxes, 
like fines, are often used to try to guide behavior; both require enforcement to achieve that end. There 
may well be noteworthy differences between a fine and a tax, but the concepts of conduct rules and 
decision rules do not identify the distinction. 
 142 Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962). Erik Luna points out that although Kadish apparently coined the term 
“overcriminalization,” critiques of the broad scope of substantive criminal law had been made for 
decades, by Roscoe Pound and others. See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Overcriminalization, 102 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 785–86 (2012). 
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be.”143 In other words, Hart’s normative account needed operational exception-
alism: it needed criminal law to operate without the opportunities for discre-
tion, and resulting indeterminacies, that were becoming increasingly widely 
recognized in other areas of law.144 But Hart couldn’t plausibly assert opera-
tional exceptionalism as empirical fact. Hart mostly left the problem unre-
solved—“this is not the place to pursue these questions in detail”—but did 
claim that when criminal prohibitions were properly narrow in scope, focused 
only on securing “the basic obligations of responsible citizenship,” police and 
prosecutorial discretion could be sufficiently limited.145 Hart used the empiri-
cal reality of wide enforcement discretion selectively, to criticize the parts of 
criminal law he most wanted to prune away: regulatory crimes that involved 
“conduct which is not intrinsically wrongful,” and strict liability offenses.146 
The vision of criminal law that Hart labeled “elementary” in 1958 thus 
combines aspiration and description to set forth an exceptionalist paradigm: it 
claims that criminal law is uniquely essential and narrowly targeted to address 
distinctive social harms; it asserts a substance-procedure dichotomy that privi-
leges substantive law; and it assumes that enforcement procedures can be dis-
ciplined by, and made to serve, substantive law. These ideas have dominated 
criminal law pedagogy and scholarship for more than half a century, and the 
next Part will trace ways that the exceptionalist paradigm is linked to the 
growth of the carceral state. 
In suggesting relative consensus around the exceptionalist paradigm, I 
have said little about the main debate that occupied criminal law theorists in 
the latter half of the twentieth century: that between consequentialism and de-
ontological theories. That debate plays out across a number of issues, most 
frequently criminalization (should criminal law target harms or wrongs?) and 
punishment (should punishment focus on desert or deterrence?). I have said 
little about arguments between consequentialists and retributivists because, 
quite simply, those arguments occur within the conceptual framework I have 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 428. 
 144 See infra notes 150–164 and accompanying text. 
 145 Hart, Jr., Aims, supra note 12, at 428. Hart claimed that the “evils” of enforcement discretion 
were in fact “common in the enforcement of most minor crimes”—which are, as discussed in Part I, 
most crimes. Id. at 429. This line of argument—that a properly narrow substantive criminal law would 
solve the problem of enforcement discretion—is a common refrain of criminal law scholarship in the 
early twenty-first century, especially scholarship criticizing present racial disparities and present in-
carceration rates. The argument is often made alongside a historical claim that recent expansions to 
substantive criminal law have created discretion that did not exist in earlier eras; it is thus useful to see 
that the fact of broad substantive laws and broad enforcement discretion was familiar by 1958, before 
the explosion of America’s prisoner population. 
 146 See id. at 423 n.56, 429. A reader could delete every appearance of the adjective “strict” from 
Hart’s list of the problems with strict criminal liability, and the resulting analysis of criminal liability 
per se would be no less accurate. See id. at 423. 
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identified; they do not challenge or unsettle it. Though particular thinkers 
seemed to favor one account or another (the Michael and Wechsler textbook 
rejected retributivism, whereas Hart criticized deterrence and consequentialist 
approaches), criminal law exceptionalism can accommodate either view. That 
is probably one key to its longevity. Indeed, it could be that, united under the 
thrall of exceptionalism, criminal law theorists needed something to argue 
about, and so they have argued over which specific theories of the nobility and 
justice of criminal law and punishment are most compelling, never seriously 
contemplating the possibility that the actual institutions of criminal law cannot 
live up to any of the professed frameworks of justification.147 Utility or retribu-
tion, public safety or just deserts: the familiar pairings are typically framed by 
scholars in opposition to one another, but in operation they function as two 
pistons in one pump, each taking over from the other when one framework 
seems to have temporarily exhausted its ability to legitimize our penal practic-
es.148 
Thus, after the sprawling, disorganized, and often arbitrary reality of 
criminal law placed the field in some disrepute among legal scholars in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a vision of dignity and reform was 
born. This vision was developed both to gain respectability for criminal law in 
the academy and to influence legal change beyond the academy. And it was, 
and still is, promulgated through the classroom. Most law schools still require 
first-year students to take a course in substantive criminal law, and though of 
course individual teachers vary in their approaches, most teach through case-
books built on the Michael and Wechsler model.149 
C. Between Nightmare and Dream 
In many ways, the exceptionalist paradigm responds to what could be 
called the embarrassment of punishment: the uncomfortable reality of the co-
erciveness and arbitrariness of criminal sanctions in a legal system presumably 
designed to protect liberty. It was not only criminal law specialists who were 
embarrassed by punishment: discomfort with the coerciveness of criminal law 
shaped midcentury modern general jurisprudence as well. This Section contin-
ues the effort to expand our understanding of mass incarceration by placing the 
criminal law theory that emerged midcentury in the context of contemporane-
                                                                                                                           
 147 Cf. Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017, 1039–47 (2014). 
 148 Cf. Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 413 (1999). 
 149 See infra Part II.A. One widely used casebook now includes a chapter on discretion at the end, 
a welcome addition that nonetheless underscores the fact that the standard doctrines covered in most 
of the book are still presented as though the doctrinal rules, and not the discretion of enforcers, were 
what mattered. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1179–
1262 (10th ed. 2017). 
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ous claims about law-in-general. Two points are key. First, criminal law excep-
tionalism was not unique to criminal law specialists. Second, even as other 
legal fields increasingly recognized discretion and indeterminacy as intrinsic to 
law, criminal law thinking would resist that view. 
On the first point, consider the concern among midcentury legal thinkers, 
and later ones, to resist Austinian positivism and its portrayal of law as com-
mands backed by sanctions. Around the same time that Henry Hart published 
The Aims of the Criminal Law, another Hart, Herbert (H.L.A.) of Britain, ad-
vanced an influential new strand of legal positivism. Coercive sanctions were 
not in fact a necessary characteristic of law, H.L.A. Hart argued, pointing to 
contract law as one instance of a form of law that conferred powers without 
threatening sanctions.150 The British Hart certainly did not deny that criminal 
law typically involved a threat of negative sanction, but he argued that criminal 
law could not serve as the paradigm for general jurisprudence—for a broad 
theory of law that was not subject-matter-specific. By treating criminal law as 
a special case, Hart and many followers have been able to offer an account of 
law-in-general that denies its essential coerciveness. In short, criminal law ex-
ceptionalism was attractive both to scholars of criminal law and scholars of 
general jurisprudence, and the latter group has mostly ignored criminal law as 
it searches for the definitive answer to the question, “what is law?”151 
But even if general jurisprudence mostly ignored criminal law, it did tack-
le a more general issue central to the inquiries of this Article: the extent to 
which law can be fixed or determinate prior to its implementation by human 
interpreters and enforcers. That question has been central to American legal 
theory, H.L.A. Hart suggested in a 1977 essay.152 Hart’s point of departure was 
the observation that American legal thought was singularly focused on courts 
rather than other legal actors. This focus was understandable, given the distinc-
tive place of judicial review in the United States.153 In the United States, Hart 
said, no one could deny that the courts were doing something other than their 
usual task in other legal systems, which was “the impartial application of de-
terminate existing rules of law in the settlement of disputes.”154 In other words, 
the unusual role of U.S. courts prompted questions about judicial discretion 
and legal indeterminacy. 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 42–43 (1961). 
 151 See, e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 3 (2011). A recent intervention by Frederick Schauer 
attempts to renew attention to law’s coerciveness, and thus may erode this form of criminal law ex-
ceptionalism. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 1–6 (2015). 
 152 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 990 (1977). 
 153 Id. at 973. 
 154 Id. at 971. 
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In a vivid image, Hart wrote that American legal thinkers seeking to ex-
plain the power of courts had “oscillated between two extremes[:] . . . the 
Nightmare and the Noble Dream.”155 The Nightmare was the claim that “in 
spite of pretensions to the contrary, judges make the law which they apply to 
litigants and are not impartial, objective declarers of existing law.”156 Hart 
found the Nightmare expressed especially powerfully in legal realism.157  At 
the other extreme, Hart identified as the Noble Dream “the belief, perhaps the 
faith, that, in spite of . . . appearances to the contrary . . . still an explanation 
and a justification can be provided for the common expectation of litigants that 
judges should apply to their cases existing law and not make new law for them 
. . . .”158 The Noble Dream, which Hart found expressed in Roscoe Pound’s 
voluminous writings, was characterized by both “particularism and holism:” a 
sense that “the specific ends and values pursued through law in a particular 
society” would, if taken as a whole and properly understood, provide adequate 
guidance to courts in moments of seeming legal indeterminacy.159 
H.L.A. Hart did not fully endorse either the Nightmare or the Noble 
Dream, and neither have most legal scholars—the images are, again, two ex-
tremes along a continuum.160 But it is important to see that most of the contin-
uum characterizes at least some legal indeterminacy as unavoidable. Human 
languages just don’t allow us to fix legal standards so precisely that we can 
avoid all disagreements, or even avoid reasonable disagreements, about the 
correct interpretation. Thus, the content of law will sometimes depend on the 
(contestable) judgment of the particular official or institution empowered to 
interpret and enforce the law. These insights—made in the most extreme form 
by legal realists, on Hart’s account—have permeated most legal fields, includ-
ing general jurisprudence itself.161 Without suggesting that jurisprudes have 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 973. 
 157 Id. at 977–78. Hart suggested that legal realism had not advanced legal theory all that much, 
but he acknowledged that it had instilled valuable awareness of possible legal indeterminacy and a call 
for honesty about extra-legal considerations that factored into legal outcomes. Id. 
 158 Id. at 978. 
 159 Id. at 978–79. Hart did not think that the Noble Dreamers had adequately answered concerns 
about judicial lawmaking; indeed, he used his discussion to take aim, one more time, at his longtime 
interlocutor and critic Ronald Dworkin, “the noblest dreamer of them all.” Id. at 982. 
 160 “Like any other nightmare and any other dream, these two are, in my view, illusions, though 
they have much of value to teach the jurist in his waking hours. The truth, perhaps unexciting, is that 
sometimes judges do one and sometimes the other.” Id. at 989. Of course, the very labeling of others’ 
ideas about law as illusions put Hart in good company with the legal realists. See supra notes 120–123 
and accompanying text. 
 161 By the 1980s, scholars began repeating the refrain “we are all legal realists now,” though with 
some quibbles about what exactly it meant to be a legal realist. See, e.g., Joseph Singer, Review Es-
say, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 503–32 (1988). One legacy of legal realism is atten-
tion to legal indeterminacy and official discretion. Much of this scholarship focuses on judicial discre-
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achieved consensus about how precisely to answer the question, what is law?, 
one may note that the very lack of consensus is partly a product of their ongo-
ing efforts to make sense of indeterminacy and discretion.162 In other words, 
outside of the field of criminal law, it is widely thought that legal indetermina-
cy and opportunities for official discretion are part of what must be explained 
when we attempt to explain the term “law.”163 Criminal law, the exceptional 
field, managed to resist these insights and retain a paradigm in which a proper-
ly drafted statutory code will supposedly provide determinacy and eliminate 
discretion. 
If we step back from the dogged focus on judicial decisionmaking and 
think more broadly of all the institutions and officials who shape legal out-
comes in particular cases, we can conceive the contrast between the Noble 
Dream and the Nightmare as a contrast between the rule of law on one hand, 
                                                                                                                           
tion. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters 
That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 386 (1975) (“Discretion exists so long as no practical 
procedure exists for determining if a result is correct, informed lawyers disagree about the proper 
result, and a judge’s decision either way will not widely be considered a failure to perform his judicial 
responsibilities.”). But the pervasiveness of agency or individual officials’ discretion is also a recur-
ring theme of administrative law scholarship. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: 
The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1494 (1983) (“All students of administrative law know . . . that 
elements of what was, and often still is, called discretion are also liberally scattered through adminis-
trative adjudication and rulemaking; there are often a number of alternatives, no single one of which is 
dictated by the law and the facts.”). Both sorts of discretion are addressed in another H.L.A. Hart 
essay, recently discovered, which claims that we must accept discretion in a legal system “because we 
are men not gods.” H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 661 (2013). 
 162 As Frederick Schauer has recently pointed out, “the boundary between law and not-law is a 
shifting one,” and “[t]he shift has not been unidirectional.” Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2435 (2017). When Christopher Columbus Langdell first began teaching Eng-
lish judicial opinions as part of his case method, students complained that what Langdell taught “was 
not law.” Id. at 2434. Among Schauer’s objects of examination is Roscoe Pound, who saw discretion 
as part of “the realm of law.” Id. at 2445–46 (citing ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 112 (1922)). 
 163 A caveat: concerns about agency discretion, and a conception of “law” that disallows such 
discretion, motivate some criticisms of the administrative state and bear some comparisons to criti-
cisms of criminal law. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 
(2014). There is much to be gained by thinking of criminal law as administrative law, as Rachel Bar-
kow has argued in much of her work. See Rachel Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 316, 316 (2014). Nevertheless, the worries about discretion, and conceptions of law that 
resist rather than accommodate discretion, are much more acute in criminal law scholarship than in 
administrative law scholarship. It is very common for criminal law scholarship to present discretion as 
pathological, whereas it seems that Hamburger’s view that administrative law is in fact “unlawful” is a 
minority view. See Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURG-
ER, supra); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence 
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 934–37 (2017). Beyond administrative law, schol-
ars in other fields often discuss the lawmaking inherent in enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Leandra 
Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1679, 1679–80 (2013) (discussing lawmaking power inherent in enforcement in the context of tax 
law). 
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and on the other, the rule of man (or rather, the rule of humans). The Noble 
Dream expresses the view—or the faith, as H.L.A. Hart suggested—that the 
content of law can be fixed sufficiently to ensure that legal outcomes will not 
depend on the personal judgments of the men and women who operate the le-
gal system. The Nightmare denies the very possibility of the rule of impersonal 
law, claiming that legal decisions always and inevitably reflect the subjective 
choices of the individual men and women who occupy positions of power. This 
juxtaposition is of obvious relevance to contemporary discussions (and older 
discussions) of criminal law, where critics despair that actual substantive crime 
definitions fail to discipline executive enforcement decisions and thus fail to 
guarantee the rule of law, but commentators overwhelmingly assume that a 
better set of statutes could achieve that end.164 Criminal law has been dominat-
ed by its own noble dream, and the nightmare of empirical realities has now 
reached a crisis. The next Part asks whether this noble dream—criminal law 
exceptionalism—might have contributed to the development and persistence of 
a criminal justice system that is (in its numbers, if not its operation) indeed 
exceptional. 
III. THE CRISIS THIS TIME 
The story told thus far is one of both continuity and change. Part I empha-
sized the continuity across U.S. history of broad substantive prohibitions and 
wide enforcement discretion. Part II traced an intellectual and pedagogical 
shift at midcentury that sought to claim a new dignity for criminal law by por-
traying “overcriminalization” and enforcement discretion as curable flaws ra-
ther than endemic features, and by portraying criminal law itself as a unique 
and uniquely necessary form of law. Those two plot lines intersect in this Part, 
which examines how criminal law came to be in crisis. This inquiry could take 
two forms. First, how and why did the criminal legal system change, especially 
with regard to the number of people incarcerated or otherwise subject to crimi-
nal sanctions? Second, how did our perceptions change, so that a system bear-
ing many features of prior eras is now seen as “in crisis”? 
The first question has already produced volumes of scholarship, much of 
which focuses on politics, policies, and institutions. My modest contribution, 
in Part III.A, is an examination of ideas and their influence on individuals: I 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 638–39 (2005). Dale’s study of American criminal law from 
the founding to 1939 also contrasts “a government of men” with “one of laws,” though she does not 
explicitly name enforcement discretion and indeterminacy as the central factors distinguishing the two 
realms. DALE, supra note 27, at 5. But, her characterization of American criminal law until the 1940s 
as a system governed “by men,” and her intimation that the rule of law was finally attained in the 
1940s, is consistent with the Nightmare / Dream dichotomy discussed here. 
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suggest that criminal law exceptionalism initially led many to seek, and others 
to acquiesce in, substantial expansions in criminal law enforcement. One di-
mension of exceptionalism—the claim that criminal law should be used spar-
ingly—was eclipsed by another—the claim that criminal law served unique 
functions that could not be achieved by other measures. Part III.B argues that 
as enforcement capacity and prison populations grew, the sheer scale of the 
system made it increasingly difficult to muddle normative aspirations and de-
scriptive claims in the way that Henry Hart and other midcentury exceptional-
ists did. Exceptionalism remains today the dominant conceptual account of 
criminal law, but the gap between that account and our practices is too large 
and obvious to ignore. Reality overtook the dream, and thus was born a crisis. 
A. The Incarceration Investment 
In the last few decades of the twentieth century, American criminal law 
enforcement acted against a far greater portion of the country’s population than 
this country, or any other, had previously known. The increase in the prison 
population from about 100 per 100,000 in 1970 to a high of about 750 per 
100,000 in 2008 may be the most widely publicized indicator of this change, 
but most convicted persons do not go to prison, and incarceration rates do not 
capture the full extent of the transformation.165 From the 1970s through 2010, 
the number of persons serving sentences of probation or community supervi-
sion more than quadrupled; the number of persons under parole supervision 
after a prison sentence increased by almost the same order of magnitude.166 It 
is likely, though the data is not readily available, that misdemeanor convictions 
and criminal interventions not resulting in conviction, such as an arrest fol-
lowed by dismissal, also increased steadily in the second half of the century.167 
All of these burdens have been imposed disproportionately often on per-
sons of color and the poor. For many persons in these demographic groups, 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Neal & Rick, supra note 16, at 34–37. 
 166 See Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 1015, 1018 (2013) (also citing incarceration rate data). 
 167 The nationwide arrest rate was estimated at 3,640 per 100,000 in 1960. U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1960, at 90 tbl.15. It climbed slowly but steadily over the next few 
decades, to 4,287.7 per 100,000 in 1970, 4,652.8 per 100,000 in 1980, and 5,804.6 per 100,000 in 
1990. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1970, at 120 tbl.23; U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
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roughly flat throughout the 1980s and have been declining since 1990, but this article does not analyze 
misdemeanor arrest data prior to 1980. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misde-
meanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 749 (2018). As Stevenson and Mayson emphasize, arrests are 
not always classified consistently or recorded reliably, and the available arrest data does not give a 
complete picture of police interventions. See id. at 749–50. 
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criminal law now structures state-citizen interactions to such a substantial de-
gree that it seems a defining characteristic of the polity, even for those not 
presently imprisoned—prompting the proliferation of the label “the carceral 
state.”168 And while a few commentators defend the interventions and call for 
still more, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the scale, distribution, and 
results of all this criminal law. The whole mess is seen as a crisis. 
Scholars have offered several different explanations for mass incarcera-
tion and other expansions of criminal law. Some studies point to too much de-
mocracy, or not enough; broad political and economic changes; shifts in politi-
cal culture; and efforts to preserve and reinforce racial hierarchy.169 Other work 
tries to identify the specific legal mechanisms that have most directly led to 
new convictions and more prisoners, such as prosecutorial decisions or sen-
tencing policies.170 Many of these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and 
there is a sense in which today’s carceral state is overdetermined.171 With one 
exception, I do not contest any specific causal account of mass incarceration or 
                                                                                                                           
 168 The phrase “carceral state” appears to have been popularized by Marie Gottschalk. See, e.g., 
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6; Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Car-
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criminal law scholars before the late 2000s, but seems a direct outgrowth of Michel Foucault’s earlier 
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cial institutions. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 297 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (describing a home for “juvenile delinquents” as “the most famous of a 
whole series of institutions which, well beyond the frontiers of criminal law, constituted what one 
might call the carceral archipelago”). 
 169 See ALEXANDER, supra note 21; ENNS, supra note 14, at 73–98; GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, 
at 10; ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1–26 (2016); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: 
HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 113–14 (2014). 
 170 See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN 11–15 (2017) (identifying prosecutorial charging deci-
sions as a central factor driving prison growth); STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE 
SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013) (identifying sentence length as a central factor); Neal & 
Rick, supra note 16, at 1 (also focusing on sentencing policy). 
 171 The most compelling accounts attend to the interaction of many different factors, as reflected 
in the following observation made by Marie Gottschalk: 
[W]e need to look at more than just the ideological and electoral relationship between 
state power and penal policies. We need to consider the resources, the discourses, and 
the expertise that political elites employ to promote certain policies. . . . [R]esources, 
discourses, and expertise are best understood by examining them in the context of spe-
cific state and nonstate institutions and certain interest groups and social movements 
that can serve as facilitating or countervailing forces. 
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 10. Gottschalk does not reject outright political culture or ideology as a 
factor contributing to the carceral state, but she does observe that a long history of law-and-order 
rhetoric coincided with a relatively limited penal state for much of America’s history, simply because 
states and the federal government lacked any substantial enforcement capacity. Id. at 15. 
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mass criminalization.172 But I do think one line of inquiry, about the conditions 
for legal transformation rather than its causes, has not received sufficient atten-
tion. As Marie Gottschalk has observed, among political leaders and profes-
sional elites, there was little opposition to the rapid expansion of criminal law 
enforcement in the latter decades of the twentieth century.173 Indeed, a few re-
cent studies emphasize that liberals and progressives, no less than conservative 
proponents of law and order, actively sought ever more enforcement.174 This is 
curious for many reasons, not the least of which is the money: building the 
carceral state was a very expensive endeavor, and in a country often wary of 
big government and increases in public spending, one might have thought that 
the cost of so much enforcement would have drawn more opposition from fis-
cal conservatives, if no one else. What made this investment seem obviously 
necessary and worthwhile? The first Subsection below considers the role of 
criminal law exceptionalism in the context of advocacy for expanded criminal-
ization and enforcement policies; the second considers the exceptionalist para-
digm in the context of individual prosecutions and case adjudications. The 
third Subsection examines how exceptionalism influenced a nascent sense of 
crisis in criminal law toward the end of the twentieth century, leading legal 
professionals to call for doubling down on the investment in the carceral state. 
1. Nothing Else Will Do 
As we have seen, American criminal law has long had broad substantive 
prohibitions, but the capacity to enforce these prohibitions expanded dramati-
cally in the twentieth century. Prohibition cemented a role for the federal gov-
ernment not only in enacting and enforcing a federal criminal code, but also in 
                                                                                                                           
 172 My analysis is directly at odds with the claim advanced in some of William Stuntz’s work, and 
in some other scholars’ work, that the Supreme Court constrained enforcement procedures and thereby 
triggered a backlash in which legislatures dramatically expanded the scope of substantive criminal 
law. See supra notes 11, 19, 20, 27, 81 and accompanying text. 
 173 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 2 (“[W]hy didn’t the rise of the carceral state face more politi-
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 174 See HINTON, supra note 169, at 8; MURAKAWA, supra note 169, at 12, 13, 67. Notwithstand-
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stead, she aims to correct a “master narrative of conservative ascendance” in which liberals were “vir-
tuous losers” on issues of crime policy. See MURAKAWA, supra note 169, at 112. 
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coordinating and assisting state-level law enforcement efforts.175 The end of 
Prohibition in 1933 did not mean the end of these projects; instead, over the 
subsequent decades, the federal government continued both to extend its own 
criminal jurisdiction and enforcement efforts, and also to fund and assist local 
and state law enforcement. A few recent studies emphasize the importance of 
the Safe Streets Act of 1968, which initially allocated 400 million dollars to 
build law enforcement capacity and created the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) to disperse the funds.176 The LEAA remained in place 
for not much more than a decade, but during that period it distributed about 25 
billion dollars, with about three quarters of that money going to policing.177 
Even after the LEAA was unwound, states managed to find the money for in-
creases in criminal justice spending that continued for decades.178 
Criminal law exceptionalism was the intellectual framework in which 
most of this expansion took place. Experts were hardly unaware that enforce-
ment was increasing and prison populations were climbing.179 Some commen-
tators continued to raise the perennial complaints about overcriminalization, 
but these critics most often argued against strict criminal liability and regulato-
ry offenses, which rarely result in prison sentences. Few commentators argued 
for the decriminalization of the types of offenses that actually put large num-
bers of people in prison—property offenses, drug trafficking (rather than mere 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 27, at 269–72; GOTTSCHALK, 
supra note 6, at 59–65; WALKER, supra note 34, at 158–63; see also infra notes 61–91 and accompa-
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 176 See e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 85–86; HINTON, supra note 169, at 2–3. See generally 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 
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MENT, 1990, at 2 (1992) (reporting that “[s]tate government expenditure for building prisons [alone] 
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(reporting an “increase in total justice expenditure by [s]tate governments . . . reflected in all justice 
sectors”). 
 179 The Bureau of Justice Statistics has been publishing its reports on the total U.S. prisoner popu-
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possession), and crimes involving some threat or use of violence.180 Though 
criminal law exceptionalism implies that criminal law should be used sparing-
ly, it offers no criminalization theory that would foreclose the codification of 
the offenses for which prison sentences are actually imposed. 
Indeed, criminal law exceptionalism can actually fuel the expansion of 
criminal law insofar as it claims that criminal sanctions serve unique functions. 
The precise nature of those functions may vary from one commentator to an-
other: some assert that criminal sanctions are the only way to appropriately 
condemn wrongful behavior; others assert that criminal sanctions achieve con-
sequences, such as deterrence or moral education, that are not attainable by 
other means.181 In some instances, commentators simply insist that criminal 
sanctions are necessary without specifying what exactly the sanctions are ex-
pected to accomplish. But the common suggestion is that for some types of 
social problems, nothing else but criminal punishment will do. 
The perception that criminal law serves functions that cannot be served in 
any other way may help explain how diverse interests and advocacy groups 
converged in their support for expanded penal power. For example, feminists 
and women’s groups concerned about domestic abuse and sexual assaults saw 
increased prosecutions and punishment as necessary responses. Forms of re-
sistance that did not embrace criminal law or state institutions, such as vigilan-
tism, self-help, or public shaming became eclipsed by calls for greater crimi-
nalization and increased state power.182 At the same time, black political ma-
jorities in some urban areas also supported “tough-on-crime” measures that 
contributed to mass incarceration.183 Unlike the women’s rights advocates who 
wanted criminal sanctions to be directed against a different demographic 
group, these black majorities pushed for increased enforcement against mem-
bers of their own communities. They often did so out of a sense of desperation 
in a time of high crime rates. Not all of the black leaders and advocates who 
supported increased criminal enforcement were exceptionalists; many of them 
also sought social welfare measures, employment assistance, and other non-
criminal policies to address violence and other problems in their communi-
ties.184 These other sorts of reforms were never broadly implemented, though, 
and black support for criminal sanctions and enforcement was only too eagerly 
accepted by other political leaders. 
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In both the advocacy for increased criminalization of offenses against 
women and the quest by black leaders to expand enforcement in their own 
communities, two related themes are striking. The first is a poignant apparent 
inconsistency: recurring skepticism about whether criminal interventions 
would actually keep women, or black communities, safer was coupled with the 
insistence that the criminal interventions were nonetheless necessary.185 In oth-
er words, the contradiction between aspirations for criminal law and its empir-
ical realities that has long characterized pedagogy and scholarship was alive 
and well among advocates who might otherwise have opposed penal expan-
sion. 
A second theme may help explain the endurance of the apparently para-
doxical view that criminal law is both ineffective and necessary. Here I have in 
mind the specific argument for criminal law’s necessity: In pro-criminalization 
arguments of both women’s rights advocates and black communities, one finds 
often the suggestion that criminal law provides a distinctive form of condem-
nation for which there is simply no substitute. In its most extreme form, the 
suggestion is that to decriminalize an action (or fail to criminalize it) is to en-
dorse and approve it. So, for example, advocates for domestic abuse victims 
argued that a failure to arrest and prosecute domestic abusers constituted an 
implicit approval of the abuse.186 Similarly, black political leaders in Washing-
ton, D.C. and elsewhere sometimes rejected drug decriminalization proposals 
or other efforts to mitigate the impact of criminal law on black communities—
not because the leaders failed to see how criminal interventions could be harm-
ful, but because they worried that decriminalization would be understood as an 
endorsement of the previously prohibited activity.187 These arguments are man-
ifestations of criminal law exceptionalism, which cultivates the conviction that 
a failure to criminalize is an expression of indifference or even approval. 
2. One Defendant at a Time 
As discussed in Part II, criminal law exceptionalism asserted a substance-
procedure hierarchy in which the “law” resides in substantive crime defini-
tions, and enforcement procedures are supposed to serve merely as a handmaid 
to substantive law.188 This way of thinking about criminal law renders substan-
tive guilt—the fact of having violated a substantive prohibition—as the most 
important criterion to evaluate criminal law outcomes. It encourages the view 
that procedural missteps are technicalities, especially if they are unlikely to 
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have affected the determination of guilt or innocence.189 And it discourages 
assessments of aggregate outcomes, such as evaluations of criminal law that 
focus on the overall demographics of those convicted. In other words, criminal 
law exceptionalism asks us to take one defendant at a time. If that defendant is 
in fact substantively guilty, his conviction is appropriate—perhaps even if 
there were procedural missteps, and even if aggregate conviction data shows 
systemic racial disparities. 
With that individualist framework in mind, consider now the concept of 
“mass” incarceration.190 Unlike mass media or mass communication, concepts 
that refer to the exposure of ideas or messages to many individuals all at once, 
mass incarceration didn’t reach millions of undifferentiated individuals in a 
single instant. Indeed, former federal prosecutor and FBI director James 
Comey once objected to the term “mass incarceration” precisely because it 
denied the individualized adjudication of each criminal defendant. After noting 
that “mass incarceration” first arose as a term to describe World War II intern-
ment camps where large groups were held without any individualized adjudi-
cation, Comey relayed how he tried to explain to then-President Barack 
Obama the problems with the phrase: 
I thought the term was both inaccurate and insulting to a lot of good 
people in law enforcement who cared deeply about helping people 
. . . . It was inaccurate in that there was nothing “mass” about the in-
carceration: every defendant was charged individually, represented 
individually by counsel, convicted by a court individually, sentenced 
individually, reviewed on appeal individually, and incarcerated. That 
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added up to a lot of people in jail, but there was nothing “mass” 
about it, I said. And the insulting part . . . was the way it cast as ille-
gitimate the efforts by cops, agents, and prosecutors—joined by the 
black community—to rescue hard-hit neighborhoods.191 
It is not clear how much of this perspective Comey retained after hearing 
President Obama’s response, but the fact that Comey made this critique at all 
(and then chose to replay his argument in what would be a much-publicized 
memoir) illustrates the influence of the exceptionalist paradigm.192 Comey is 
right that unlike the mass detentions of persons of Japanese ancestry during 
World War II, the state of affairs we now call mass incarceration was, in fact, 
achieved through millions of separate legal proceedings, albeit very few tri-
als.193 But millions of separate proceedings can nonetheless add up to a mass 
phenomenon. As noted at the outset of this Article, mass incarceration requires 
mass prosecutions. To put one percent of the nation’s population in prison (and 
impose convictions on a still larger fraction of the population), prosecutors, the 
most powerful actors in the criminal enforcement process, needed to decide to 
pursue charges, to pursue severe charges, and to pursue severe sentences—
again and again, ad infinitum.194 
Criminal law exceptionalism helps explain how this could happen. The 
vision of criminal law advanced by Jerome Michael, Herbert Wechsler, Henry 
Hart, and others justified the heavy burdens of criminal interventions by em-
phasizing, among other things, the unique necessity and operations of criminal 
law. A wise legislature would take care to define substantive prohibitions with 
precision, identifying those who posed grave threats to society. The enforce-
ment process should then serve as handmaid to substantive law, identifying the 
actually guilty and bringing them to justice. Prosecutors know that actual sub-
stantive prohibitions span broadly, of course, and they know also the reality of 
enforcement discretion.195 But they could use one of these departures from the 
exceptionalist paradigm (enforcement discretion) to cure the other (overcrimi-
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nalization); each prosecutor could use his or her own discretion to focus on the 
defendants most worthy of prosecution. Schooled in this vision, a couple of 
generations of American prosecutors put millions of defendants in prison, like-
ly believing in each case that public safety was being protected and the indi-
vidual defendant was simply getting what he or she deserved.196 
It is also worth recalling here that the vision of criminal law developed in 
the United States in the middle of the twentieth century was an explicit effort 
to claim dignity and nobility for criminal law after decades in which it had 
been viewed as a grimy and unprincipled field. American law schools increas-
ingly began to teach law students that prosecution is indeed a higher calling, 
and one can hear the echoes of that training in Comey’s indignation at the “in-
sulting” suggestion that his efforts, and those of other prosecutors, might now 
be viewed as illegitimate. Comey is, of course, but one example. Ex-prosecutor 
literature is a genre that includes many similar tales of a belief that to be a 
prosecutor is to be on the side of the angels, protecting society and “doing jus-
tice” even while providing due process to each individual “douchebag” or 
“cretin.”197 
The American judiciary has been trained in the same vision of criminal law 
as American prosecutors, and one can see a similar emphasis on the individual 
defendant’s substantive guilt, to the exclusion of systemic considerations, in 
many areas of legal doctrine.198 This Article cannot accommodate a full survey 
of these doctrines, but one particular line of judicial decisions is worth noting. As 
racial inequalities in law enforcement became better documented and more pro-
nounced in the latter decades of the twentieth century, some defendants and civil 
rights advocates attempted to use constitutional guarantees of equality to chal-
lenge these racial disparities in the growing carceral state.199 Courts responded 
by denying the relevance of statistical evidence of systemic disparities in the 
absence of more specific indications of intentional discrimination by enforce-
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ment officials.200 The implication was that criminal sentences were to be as-
sessed in isolation from one another, and individual guilt was the paramount 
consideration in reviewing a sentence. A defendant who was in fact substantively 
guilty could not avoid conviction, or a harsh sentence, merely because people of 
color were more often prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced than similarly situated 
white defendants. By prioritizing substantive guilt over enforcement choices, 
and by denying or obscuring the scope of enforcement discretion and the racial-
ized patterns in which that discretion was exercised, criminal law exceptionalism 
discouraged or foreclosed systemic critiques. Instead, it offered an ideological 
framework that allowed prosecutors to keep pursuing convictions, one at a time, 
without noticing that they were producing outcomes that would add up to mass 
incarceration. 
3. Doubling Down 
Today, criminal justice reform is associated with downsizing, but in the 
1980s and 1990s, making criminal law “better” did not mean making it small-
er. In these two decades during which prison populations exploded most dra-
matically, the sheer numbers of prisoners were not seen as a crisis. To the con-
trary, in the last years of the twentieth century, criminal justice experts identi-
fied a different crisis: the failure to expand enforcement capacity enough. A 
1988 American Bar Association (ABA) report may have been the first source 
to identify a criminal justice crisis once the extraordinary increase in prisoners 
was underway.201 Like the Michael and Wechsler textbook and Henry Hart’s 
The Aims of the Criminal Law, this 1988 report, fittingly titled Criminal Jus-
tice in Crisis, provides a useful window into expert opinion about criminal law 
at a particular historical moment. The report suggests some fracturing of ex-
ceptionalist claims among persons (other than prosecutors) involved in the dai-
ly operation of criminal law. But it also suggests that in the midst of construc-
tion of the carceral state, professional elites could not imagine any reform oth-
er than still more expansion. 
Intriguingly, though the number of people in prison had approximately 
doubled in the decade preceding the 1988 ABA report, that increase was nei-
ther the motivation for the report nor one of its central themes.202 Instead, the 
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Criminal Justice Section of the ABA commissioned and funded a committee 
“to study the impact of constitutional rights on crime and crime control in the 
United States.”203 Specifically, the committee was asked to investigate the ba-
sis, if any, for an apparently widely held public perception that the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments prohibited the criminal system from functioning 
effectively—that is, from identifying the substantively guilty and convicting 
them. After two years of interviewing or hearing testimony from police offic-
ers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, the committee concluded that 
the public perception of constitutional law that “handcuffed the cops” was un-
founded, and that professionals throughout the system saw constitutional pro-
tections as relatively inconsequential.204 Aside from some of the defense attor-
neys interviewed, most of the report’s sources and the authors of the report 
themselves seemed to view this lack of constitutional interference as good 
news.205 Process remained a subservient handmaid, just as she should. 
But that was only one finding of a report titled Criminal Justice in Crisis. 
If constitutional constraints had little effect on efforts to convict and punish, 
and if that constitutional impotence was cause for relief rather than regret, 
what was the crisis? The rest of the report emphasized two major themes. First, 
all institutions of criminal law, from police to prosecutors and public defenders 
to courts to prisons, were inadequately funded: “The entire system is 
starved.”206 Second, the public did not understand the capacities of criminal 
law well, and in particular did not appreciate that no amount of criminal prohi-
bition and enforcement could “eliminate the crime problem.”207 
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Take the second theme first, which may seem remarkable as a summary 
of enforcement professionals’ views, but which in fact echoes earlier nation-
wide studies of the criminal legal system.208 The ABA’s own two-year effort to 
figure out how professionals within the criminal system perceived its problems 
found many judges and law enforcement officials repeating this refrain: we are 
not the solution to the problem of crime, not because we don’t have enough 
money (though we don’t), but because we are the wrong kind of response.209 
Notably, prosecutors are not among those that the report quotes as expressing 
this view, which is consistent with the account of prosecutorial ideology in the 
previous Subsection. But to many others who worked in the criminal legal sys-
tem every day, the grander claims of criminal law exceptionalism were neither 
credible nor helpful. The exceptionalist promise that criminal law (and only 
criminal law) could solve profound social problems created expectations that 
many insiders knew would never be fulfilled. 
But it is possible to hold the seemingly paradoxical view that criminal law 
is both ineffective and necessary, as discussed above.210 And thus the ABA 
coupled its finding that insiders viewed criminal law as inevitably ineffective 
in eliminating crime, rather than merely temporarily flawed, with a denounce-
ment of the underfunding of criminal legal institutions, and a call for more 
money.211 Criminal justice expenditures had been climbing substantially na-
tionwide for several years prior to the report,212 and it seems that it would have 
been worth asking why still more money should be put into legal responses 
that do not and cannot accomplish what the public hopes they will accomplish. 
If the members of the ABA committee had addressed this question directly, 
some of them may have argued that criminal sanctions achieve sufficient deter-
rence to make the interventions worthwhile, or some may have argued that 
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prosecution and punishment serve retributive ends even if they do not reduce 
or eliminate crime.213 Instead, the committee simply pronounced criminal jus-
tice as “important” and worthy of further investment.214 This approach is illus-
trative of the function of criminal law exceptionalism, as described in Part II: it 
posits the importance and necessity of criminal law as a self-evident truth, 
without requiring any close scrutiny of what criminal law accomplishes. It al-
lows retributive and consequentialist theories to function as two pistons in one 
pump, but always assumes that some theory is available to justify criminal in-
terventions.215 The report’s final recommendation on funding should draw a 
smile, or else chagrin: “The ABA and other bar associations must use their in-
fluence to alert the public and legislatures to the fact that quality criminal jus-
tice costs a great deal more than we are spending today. It should be empha-
sized, though, that quality will not necessarily improve with the expenditure of 
additional monies.”216 Indeed. 
In the academy, the professionals’ pessimism about what criminal law 
could accomplish seemed not to register. Legal scholars cited the ABA report 
for its finding that constitutional rights didn’t impede prosecutions, and for its 
call for increased investment across criminal justice institutions.217 The “crisis” 
in the report’s title, at least as perceived by many readers and seemingly as 
intended by its authors, was a crisis of underfunding—a problem of not enough 
policing, prosecutions, and punishment, rather than a problem of excess.218 
And so the country doubled down on its investment, continuing to increase 
criminal justice spending, and over the fifteen years that followed the ABA’s 
declaration of crisis, the prison population more than doubled again.219 
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B. Buyers’ Remorse 
Back in 1988, a little over a decade into a vast prison expansion, the first 
glimmer of crisis was the concern that we were not putting enough money into 
the project. But after another decade of prison expansion, murmurs of a very 
different critique began to arise. The term “mass incarceration,” which had 
previously been used to describe specific carceral efforts such as the World 
War II internment of Japanese Americans, began to creep into scholarly dis-
course as a description of U.S. sentencing policy more generally.220 Major 
newspapers began to report on climbing incarceration rates, noting both that 
they were historically unprecedented and globally exceptional.221 On the eve of 
a new century and indeed a new millennium, a few efforts to take stock of the 
criminal system began to question both the overall scale and the racial distribu-
tion of American punishment.222 Those critiques gathered momentum and drew 
more adherents, so that today there is an apparent consensus that American 
criminal law is too severe, too inegalitarian, and in need of substantial contrac-
tion.223 Instead of putting more money into criminal enforcement, a wide array 
of experts and commentators now call for scaling back. 
Several developments seem to have contributed to this shift in opinion, 
though it is probably impossible to ascertain precisely which factors were most 
important. First, the simple collection and publication of data may have forced 
a reckoning that exceptionalists would have otherwise avoided. The sheer 
numbers command attention—the oft-recited statistics about prison popula-
tions and rates of incarceration, both overall and among specific racial groups. 
The numbers also command investigation: are all these prisoners really com-
mitting acts that threaten society’s very existence? Are racial minorities and 
poor people committing such acts at disproportionate rates? Investigations of 
racial disparities have in turn drawn considerable attention to the prevalence of 
enforcement discretion. That discretion was always there, of course, but now it 
is being used to build something so big we cannot look away. As I suggested 
above, criminal law’s noble dream is being overtaken by reality. That dream—
the exceptionalist paradigm—combines aspirational claims with descriptive 
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ones without taking much care to distinguish them, but that works only as long 
as we are not forced to confront the facts too closely. 
Shifts in opinion are also partly a product of the steady resistance to the 
carceral state from the communities most burdened by criminal law interven-
tions. Defendants and prisoners, and their families, have long resisted both in-
dividual prosecutions and broader carceral policies, sometimes through litiga-
tion and sometimes outside of it.224 But as more and more Americans encoun-
ter police interventions and live with criminal convictions, there are more par-
ticipants in, and greater opportunities for, collective resistance through activ-
ism, advocacy, and public discourse.225 It should also be noted here that the 
carceral state is increasingly in public view, partly because of technological 
changes such as ubiquitous cameras, and because it has become too big to 
hide, but also because of influential works designed for popular, rather than 
elite, audiences. Mass incarceration reached mass culture. Efforts to highlight 
the continuities between the contemporary criminal system and historical 
instituions of racial oppresion such as slavery or Jim Crow have been 
particularly effective, it seems.226 
Again, many factors have contributed to a sharp increase in the frequency 
and intensity of critiques of American criminal law, and I do not attempt to 
identify all or rank the most influential. For purposes of this Article, it is more 
important to notice what is so far missing from the changed discourse: any ma-
jor modification of the intellectual paradigm used by academics and profes-
sionals to teach, study, and evaluate criminal law. Criminal law exceptionalism 
is alive and well in scholarly literature, and it is alive and well in reform pro-
posals. And so long as it is also alive and well in the criminal law classrooms 
where the next generation of legal professionals are trained, its influence is not 
likely to wane. 
Criminal law exceptionalism continues to distort scholarly efforts both to 
explain and to reverse the growth of the carceral state. Because exceptionalism 
conceptualizes criminal law in terms of substantive crime definitions and the 
punishments they authorize, it invites the conclusion that prison populations 
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expanded because substantive criminal law either covered more conduct, or 
authorized longer sentences, or both. There is little evidence for the first claim, 
as Part I suggests. There is indeed evidence that changes in sentencing policy 
fueled prison growth, but prosecutorial choices also played an important 
role.227 Academics were slow to acknowledge prosecutors’ influence on mass 
incarceration, and this is likely because, again, exceptionalism excludes en-
forcement choices from its conception of “law.”228 To the extent that changes 
in the enforcement process have figured in the prevailing explanations of mass 
incarceration developed by legal scholars, one recurring claim has been that 
constraints on the enforcement process imposed by the Supreme Court in the 
1960s triggered legislative backlash and the expansion of substantive criminal 
law.229 That argument has influenced many legal scholars, but it has fared less 
well in other fields. In history, political science, and disciplines less shaped by 
criminal law exceptionalism, studies of twentieth century criminal law identify 
a vast expansion of enforcement capacity and resources as a key driver of in-
creased incarceration.230 
Indeed, a focus on enforcement is important not just to explain prison 
growth, but to describe the full scope of contemporary criminal law, in which 
incarceration is just the tip of a very big iceberg. As scholars increasingly real-
ize, mass incarceration is an imperfect term if it is understood strictly in terms 
of prisoners.231 If we wish also to address criminal convictions that do not re-
sult in prison sentences, the burdens of collateral consequences on those with 
criminal records, and the independent burdens imposed by police interven-
tions, something like “the carceral state” or “mass criminalization” better cap-
tures the full reach of late twentieth and early twenty-first century criminal 
law.232 Criminal law is not simply a collection of statutes and liability doc-
                                                                                                                           
 227 PFAFF, supra note 170, at 11–15; Neal & Rick, supra note 16, at 3 fig.1 (displaying rising 
incarceration rates in the United States from 1970 to 2013). 
 228 See John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Pris-
on Growth Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 270 (2014). 
 229 See, e.g., Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, supra note 23, at 780. 
 230 See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6; HINTON, supra note 169; MURAKAWA, supra note 169. 
These works all emphasize the money allocated to law enforcement, and give less attention to consti-
tutional criminal procedure. There are, however, occasional references to the Supreme Court’s author-
izations of expansive police and prosecutorial authority. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 62–
63 (noting that during the 1920s, “the courts granted the police new wide-ranging search-and-seizure 
powers that long outlasted Prohibition”); HINTON, supra note 169, at 326 (noting the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to restrict police and prosecutorial discretion in cases of alleged racial profiling). 
 231 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 21. 
 232 For more on “the carceral state,” see GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6, at 1. “Mass criminalization” 
is often used to call greater attention to misdemeanors; scholars vary on whether the term refers only 
to minor offenses or all types of criminal interventions. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Po-
licing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 548–52 (2016) (defining mass criminalization as “the criminalization 
of relatively non-serious behavior or activities, and the multiple ways in which criminal justice actors, 
 
2019] An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration 2007 
trines, but also a wide array of enforcement practices. The story of contempo-
rary American criminal law is a story of radical growth in the enforcement ap-
paratus. 
Criminal law exceptionalism continues to shape understandings of the 
past and present, but also proposals for the future. Some reform proposals are 
openly nostalgic, trying to recover a prior golden age of criminal law, trying to 
make criminal law great again.233 We should be wary of calls to restore local 
control in criminal law, or to reinvigorate the jury (which, of course, never 
played the role that the dreamers imagine), or to pursue the same narrow de-
criminalization efforts that failed at midcentury.234 We should not try to go 
backwards in criminal law. There never was a golden age of criminal law, nor 
even a gilded one.235 Over the last half century, America made its criminal sys-
tem much bigger, but neither “over”-criminalization, nor discretion, nor race 
and class disparities were invented in that time period. These features of crimi-
nal law are just features, not bugs. That reality should be front and center as we 
decide whether and how to use criminal interventions. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems of American criminal law are deep and structural, and “car-
ceral” is an adjective now reasonably applied not just to discrete institutions 
but to the American state itself. But to advance a structural critique does not 
require us to overlook the various seemingly small decisions that contributed 
to present incarceration rates.236 Among those small decisions are political 
leaders’ choices to adopt more severe sentencing policies, prosecutorial choic-
es to charge more severe crimes and seek more severe sentences, and judicial 
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decisions to uphold prosecutors’ decisions and to reject defense challenges. 
There is considerable evidence that prosecutorial decisions have been particu-
larly important: again, mass incarceration requires mass prosecutions. The in-
dividual political officials, judges, and prosecutors who have made the deci-
sions that contributed to mass incarceration are not automatons, or so this Arti-
cle has assumed. Prosecutors and judges—legal professionals—made similarly 
punitive decisions across thousands and thousands of cases, but they did not do 
so unthinkingly, or again, so I have assumed. In seeking to develop an intellec-
tual history of mass incarceration, my quest has been to better understand what 
frames of thought have informed the decisions that produced the carceral state. 
Criminal law exceptionalism is the framework in which American law 
schools have educated legal professionals for more than half a century; it is the 
primary framework in which legal academics analyze and evaluate criminal 
law. As this Article has shown, it is a framework that claims a special status 
and importance for criminal law, arguing that for certain kinds of problems, 
criminal law is necessary and there simply is no alternative response. It is a 
framework that recognizes the great burdens imposed by criminal law but 
nonetheless proclaims the nobility and dignity of those imposing those bur-
dens. It is a framework that assuages normative concerns about criminal law 
burdens by asserting the distinctive operation of criminal law. The exceptional-
ist paradigm teaches that the burdens of policing and punishment can be lim-
ited to the deserving (or the sufficiently suspicious) by well-designed substan-
tive law. Or, in the phrase Charles Clark popularized almost a century ago, 
procedure is to serve as the handmaid and not the mistress of substantive 
law.237 
We would do well to remember, though, Clark’s subsequent caution: “A 
handmaid, no matter how devoted, seems never averse to becoming mistress of 
a household should opportunity offer.”238 In practice, enforcement is and has 
long been the mistress, in the sense that enforcers make key decisions and 
wield substantial power. This is increasingly acknowledged in other areas of 
law.239 Perhaps it is time to reassess criminal law exceptionalism—to seek a 
more honest account of the ways in which criminal law is special. As I have 
emphasized, the burdens of criminal law are indeed distinctive. But it is a mis-
take to assume that criminal law can operate in a way that ensures those bur-
dens are imposed only when necessary. 
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Were we to seek a different paradigm, the first step would be to describe 
criminal law more accurately. We might acknowledge that criminal law in-
volves an array of procedures and practices, each providing officials with con-
siderable discretion at various points. It is not a set of determinate substantive 
prohibitions, nor an orderly system.240 Criminal law involves a range of differ-
ent authorized interventions, some of them indistinguishable from “civil” in-
terventions except by label, and some of them more physically coercive or 
stigmatizing than any civil sanction.241 The everyday work of criminal law is a 
series of enforcement decisions about when and how to deploy these various 
interventions, and the outcomes of these decisions are often unpredictable. 
Criminal law is best understood as a process through which the state 
manages an array of perceived problems. These problems targeted by criminal 
law are not themselves exceptional; there is no natural or pre-legal content to 
the terms crime or criminality.242 Criminals have no “essential characteristics.” 
Instead, criminality is a concept long used by governments to manage a range 
of different putatively troublesome people and acts, from acts of interpersonal 
violence to violations of property rights to various forms of risk creation to 
trivial manifestations of unproductivity, recalcitrance, or nonconformity. Many 
of the problems targeted by criminal law are identified by written statutes, but 
not all—enforcers often adapt statutes to new purposes, and some enforcement 
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interventions don’t even require evidence of a particular statutory violation.243 
Substantive criminal law is broad, but it is not distinctive: Nearly every kind of 
behavior addressed through criminal law could be, and often is, addressed also 
through civil law. Moreover, substantive criminal law does relatively little to 
discipline process or determine outcomes; instead, decisions in the enforce-
ment process determine who will become a criminal. 
I have just offered only a brief sketch of a non-exceptionalist account of 
criminal law. There is much more work to be done. The study of criminal law, 
far from being a backwater, is full of opportunities to move beyond exception-
alist ideology; it is full of opportunities to work out the practical details of a 
different relationship between state and citizen. To take advantage of these op-
portunities, though, one must reject the exceptionalist conflation of aspiration 
and description.244 Human imperfections, private and public, are the point of 
departure for criminal law. Our questions should be ones about how to manage 
and mitigate imperfection, including the imperfections of law itself. One key 
question: In a world without constraints on substantive criminal law, is it wise 
to seek as much enforcement as possible? Unwinding the carceral state proba-
bly means limiting both the capacity and the legal authority of enforcers, and it 
will probably require that we imagine civil law responses to many of the prob-
lems at which we now throw criminal sanctions. 
Again, as soon as we contemplate the possibility of criminal interven-
tions, we are speaking of an imperfect world, a world in which not only indi-
viduals but various social institutions have failed. And as we contemplate 
criminal interventions, it is crucial to keep in mind that they will be adminis-
tered by humans. The rule of law always is the rule of men and women, which 
is not a reason to avoid law, but it may be a reason to avoid the most coercive 
and violent forms of law. If criminal law is seen as exceptional only for its vio-
lence and inegalitarianism, not in its very nature or subject matter, then the 
substitution of other interventions for criminal ones becomes much more pos-
sible. 
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